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THE "DMDEND OF DEMOCRACY": 
ANALYZING U.S. SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
PHILIP C. AKA* 
Abstract: For centuries, United States foreign policy has been outwardly 
characterized by its diplomatic and economic encouragement of 
fledgling democracies around the world. In particular, the nations of 
Africa are seen to benefit from America's idealistic foreign agenda. 
After forty years of independent stuggle and civil war, Nigeria has freely 
elected a leader who expresses willingness to strengthen his nation's 
global position through international trade and assistance. At this 
critical stage in Nigeria's political development, will U.S. policymakers 
pay lip service to democracy through limited "unrewarding social work" 
or will it recognize common national interests to further a "genuinely 
reciprocal and mutually beneficial" relationship? This Article critiques 
the quantity and quality of U.S. aid to Nigeria, examining underlying 
tensions and motivations, and the forces of globalization. In order for 
Nigeria to find a true and stable democracy, this Article contends, U.S. 
policy must establish Nigeria's role as an independent partner in the 
exchange of cultural and natural resources, as part of a genuine effort 
to bolster its domestic capability. 
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this Article. Finally, he gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Polly Crozier, Elizabeth 
Tedesco, Timothy A. Diemer, and their colleagues on the Boston College Third World Law 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although United States foreign policymakers have always articu-
lated a desire to seek democracy in Africa,! they have not pursued this 
goal with any degree of consistency, particularly during the Cold War 
era.2 Democracy scholars such as Professor Larry Diamond!! contend 
that U.S. policies toward Africa have, since 1990, been increasingly 
driven by a "concern for democracy, accountability, and human rights 
•••• "4 But is there any basis for the position that the United States has 
become more earnest and circumspect in its efforts to promote Afri-
can democratization? The impact of globalization further complicates 
this inquiry. 
To address this issue, this Article analyzes U.S. support of "de-
mocratization" in Nigeria since May 29,1999.5 The focus on Nigeria is 
mandated first because the nation is known throughout the world as a 
major regional power.6 Secondly, the September 11 attacks in New 
1 See Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in Africa: U.S. and International Policies in 
1Tansition, in AFRICA IN WORLD POUTICS: POST-COLD WAR CHAlLENGES 250 (John W. 
Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 2nd ed. 1995) (stating that "[s]ince the first stirrings 
of Africa's independence movements, self-determination, freedom, democracy, and hu-
man rights have been important foreign policy goals for the United States in Africa"); see 
also U.S. and Africa in the '70s, Statement on Mrican Policy by Hon. William P. Rogers, U.S. 
Secretary of State (Mar. 26, 1970), in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 482 (Ian 
Brownlie ed., 1971) (conveying that America has "a preference for democratic procedures, 
but recognizes that the forces for change and nation-building which operate in Africa may 
create governmental patterns not necessarily consistent with such procedures"). 
2 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 1, at 250-51 (lambasting the history of U.S. policies in 
Africa as "sorry"). At the risk of oversimplification, the Cold War involved the competition 
between the United States (representing the First World) and the former Soviet Union 
(representing the Second World) for the hearts and minds of peoples in the developing 
(or Third) world. The competition was bloodless as between the two powers and their 
allies, but, like any war, exceedingly costly and bloody for the Third World whose territo-
ries served as the battleground for this conflict. One consequence of this war was the dis-
appearance of the Second World and the disutility in all but the name of the "fhird 
World" for designating the developmentally diverse peoples of the developing world. For 
an overview of the history of the Cold War, focusing on the relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, see generally RONALD E. POWASKI, THE COLD WAR: 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SoVIET UNION, 1917-1991 (1998). 
5 Professor Diamond wrote his doctoral dissertation on Nigeria and has much inside 
knowledge concerning the country. A Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford 
University, he has authored and edited numerous works on democratic development in 
the world and is a founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy as well as one of the lead-
ers of the National Endowment for Democracy, based in Washington, D.C. 
4 Diamond, supra note 1, at 252. 
5 This date marked the inauguration of Nigeria's latest democracy (and republic), one 
preceded by more than fifteen years of repressive military rule. 
6 OLADIMEJI ABORISADE & ROBERT J. MUNDT, POUTICS IN NIGERIA 253 (1998). 
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York and Washington D.C. have given rise to a debate about the char-
acter and "correctness" of U. S. foreign policy;' exploring the policy 
toward Nigerian democratization lends important insight into the na-
ture of American foreign policy at this moment of controversy. Part I 
contains a brief history and overview of Nigeria's current political 
status as it strives for a genuine democracy. Part II brings to light some 
of the tensions and motivations that underlie U.S.-Nigerian relations. 
In Part III, this Article describes the contours of the United States' 
diplomatic, military, and economic support for Nigeria, addressing 
each in turn. Part IV provides a working definition for globalization, 
followed by its potential and actual effects on Nigerian democratiza-
tion. Finally, Part V concludes with four findings and argues that 
promoting democracy is an important element of U.S. policy, but that 
this ideal is often sacrificed in pursuit of pragmatic national interests. 
I. A DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIA 
A. Demographic Overview 
Nigeria is a country about two times the size of California located 
on the Gulf of Guinea in West Mrica.8 It is by far the most populous 
country in Mrica, with a population estimated at over 110 million 
people.9 With about two hundred and fifty language or ethnic 
7 See Ali A. Mazrui, Globalization: Between the Market and the Military-A Third 
World Perspective, Banquet Address at the 19th Annual Meeting of the Association of 
Third World Studies, Inc., Savannah, Ga. (Oct. 13, 2001), in 19 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 
(forthcoming Spring 2002) (rebutting President George Bush's characterization of the 
terrorist attacks as a "war" against American democracy or way of life and contending that 
detractors of the United States, particularly those in the Arab world, base their opposition 
on American foreign policy); see also Joseph Curl, Clinton Calls Terror a U.S. Debt to Past, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001 (conveying former President Bill Clinton's view that the suicide 
attacks on the United States are the price the country is paying today for its past sin of 
slavery and the expropriation and near-extermination of native Americans); Fareed Za-
karia, R1ly Do They Hate Us?, Special Report, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15,2001. In an old work that 
is recently drawing attention, Professor Samuel Huntington argued that world politics is 
entering a new era in which the sources of conflict will be based on cultural divisions 
rather than on ideology or economic forces. He stated that the battle lines of the future 
will be the fault lines between civilizations. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of 
Civilizations?, in GLOBAUZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY: A READER I, 
1-22 (Patrick O'Meara et al. eds., 2000). There will be more than a few people who will see 
the events of September 11, 2001 as Huntington's "clash of civilizations" Armageddon. 
8 Nigeria, in GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA 52, 52 (F. Jeffress Ramsay ed., 8th ed. 1999). 
9 [d. No other country on the continent has a population nearly as large as Nigeria'S. 
As of 1998, the population far outranks that of large countries like Ethiopia (fifty-nine 
million), Egypt (fifty-two million), and South Africa (forty-two million). GLOBAL STUDIES, 
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groups,lO it is also one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Af-
rica and in the world. Many of Nigeria's ethnic groups are small 
communities with populations that number between tens and hun-
dreds of thousands, but three of them, the Hausa-Fulanis in the North 
(two groups so interconnected they are usually counted as one), the 
Igbos in the East, and the Yorubas in the West, have populations that 
run into tens of millions. This "ethnic triumvirate" makes up about 
two-thirds of the country's population.ll 
Nigeria has large reserves of crude oil under its soil and is an im-
portant member of the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries 
(OPEC).l2 Before the discovery of oil, the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy was agriculture. Cocoa was produced in the West, ground-
nut (peanut) in the North, and palm oil in the East. lll Since the pro-
duction of commercial quantities of crude oil began in the 1970s,14 
Nigeria has depended on oil as its sole foreign exchange earner, to 
the virtual neglect of agriculture.15 One of the challenges successive 
governments in the country face is how to diversify the country's 
economy away from its heavy dependence on oil. 
B. Political History 
Nigeria is a wholesale product of British colonialism.16 The na-
tion was formed in 1914, when, for administrative and economic con-
venience, Britain lumped its three colonies in the area17 together into 
supra note 8, at 53, 107, 11, 158. The country's population is an estimate because, like 
much information about Nigeria, this is a projection based on United Nations statistics. 
Censuses are a sensitive issue in Nigeria, and to date the country has not had an accurate 
headcount of its citizens. 
10 ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 57. 
11 Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praeturianism, in Pou-
TICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY 417, 419 
(Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995). 
12 See, e.g., JEDRZEJ GEORG FRYNAS, OIL IN NIGERIA: CONFUCT AND LITIGATION BE-
TWEEN OIL CoMPANIES AND VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 16-18 (2000). Other mineral re-
sources include coal, columbite, iron ore, lead, limestone, natural gas, tin, and zinc. Ni~ 
ria, supra note 8, at 52. 
13 Nigeria, supra note 8, at 54. 
14 FRYNAS, supra note 12, at 11. 
15 [d. at 25. 
16 Even the very name of the country came from Britain. See generally FREDERICK D. 
LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH TROPICAL AFRICA (1922). 
17 English presence in what is today Nigeria goes back to 1863 when Lagos came under 
British control. 
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one country in an event historians call "The Amalgamation."18 Some 
believe that Nigeria is too large and unwieldy to comprise one coun-
try. The country houses three of the largest (and most competitive) 
ethnic groups in Africa; seven percent of the world's languages are 
spoken in Nigeria, the highest number of languages in any single 
country.I9 The Amalgamation brought together, without consultation, 
a multiplicity of groups which before 1914 had a history of little con-
tact a~d interaction with one another. Attempts since independence 
to forge these groups into one nation have yielded little fruit. Nigeria 
remained under British rule for forty-six years until October 1, 1960, 
when it became independent from London.20 
At independence, the country experimented with a parliamen-
tary system of government patterned on the British Westminster 
model consisting of an executive headed by a prime minister and a 
cabinet based on collective responsibility, a bicameral national assem-
bly elected largely by universal suffrage, and an independent judici-
ary, among other features. 21 From the outset, the political system 
came under severe stress brought about by ethnic rivalry.22 The 
18 The three colonies were Lagos and the northern and southern "protectorates." Be-
cause of the difficulty they have had in forging a sense of nationhood among inhabitants, 
the Amalgamation is an event many Nigerians remember with more regret than fondness. 
Some sections of the country, particularly the north, still rue the "mistake of 1914." 1 
A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK, 
1966-1969, at 3 (1971). 
19 See ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 57 (citing ETHNOLOGUE: LANGUAGES OF 
THE WORLD (BARBARA F. GRIMES, ed., 11 th ed. 1988)). 
20 There are some who have argued that British colonial rule in Nigeria did not last 
long enough to prepare the country for independent nationhood. One state governor in 
the 1980s even called for the re-colonization of the country! But, Britain did not use what 
little time it had in Nigeria judiciously. First, its policy of indirect rule (through local rul-
ers) helped to ensure that the country became independent without the development of 
any sense of nationhood among groups. Second, its colonial policy favored the North to 
the detriment of other regions of the country. Attempts to correct these mistakes have not 
worked. See WILLIAM D. GRAF, THE NIGERIAN STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY, STATE CLASS 
AND POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA 15, 24 n.ll (1988); EGHOSA E. Os-
AGHAE, CRIPPLED GIANT: NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 6 (1998). 
21 At independence, the country's constitutional system departed from the British sys-
tem in two main respects: Nigeria adopted a federal system (in response to its great diver-
sity), and it also guaranteed fundamental rights for its citizens. British constitutionalism 
lacks both of these features. 
22 See Diamond, supra note 11, at 466 (stating that the structure of the country's feder-
alism at independence made the three major ethnic groups "in effect, governmental as 
well as ethnic categories."); see also Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in 
Nigfffia, 90 AFR. AFr. 237, 243 (1991) (conveying that federalism in Nigeria before the war, 
"was, for all practical purposes, a majorities' enclave whose stability depended on the abil-
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democratic experiment broke down in January 1966 when power 
shifted to the military in a trend that would mark the nature of Nige-
rian politics from that point forward. Worse still, ethnic disharmony 
soon degenerated into war between 1967 and 1970. The war claimed 
three million lives, most of them Igbos,23 who, with other easterners, 
seceded to form their own independent Republic of Biafra, displacing 
another three million people.24 The war has been ranked by one 
chronicler as "the bloodiest civil war of the 20th century. "25 In 1970, 
following the successful termination of Biafran secession, the country 
reunified and continued its journey toward nationhood. 
Nigeria has a federal system of government that operates as a 
unitary format, particularly during periods of military government. 
Over time, this system grew in complexity and is today made up of 
one national government, thirty-six state governments, and a federal 
capital territory (FCT) based in Abuja, 26 and numerous local gov-
ernments. Although Nigerians are a freedom-loving people with a 
passion for democratic rule,27 democracy has had a checkered history 
in Nigeria (see Table 1).28 
ity of the regional leaders to reach compromises."). Nigeria adopted federalism as a politi-
cal system in 1954 while still a British colony. 
25 See Alexander A Madiebo, Obasanjo, the Civil War, and Resource Contro~ VANGUARD 
ONUNE (Lagos),June 29, 2001, available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/ 
2001/june/29062001/p1429060l.htm. Major General Madiebo commanded the Biafran 
Army and provided an account of his stewardship as well as experiences of the war in his 
memoir, THE NIGERIAN REVOLUTION AND THE BIAFRA WAR (1980). Cf. OSAGHAE, supra 
note 20, at 69 (putting the number of deaths "at between one and three million"). 
240SAGHAE supra note 20, at 69. 
25 1 KIRK-GREENE supra note 18, at vii. Professor Kirk-Greene disclosed that this war to 
keep Nigeria unified had by 1969 earned "the unwanted distinction of becoming the big-
gest, best-weaponed, and bloodiest war in the whole history of Black Africa." See 2 KIRK-
GREENE, supra note 18, AT 462. The war assaulted the consciences of the international 
community with pictures of starving Igbo children whose stomachs were distended from 
kwashiorkor; it was the result of the Nigerian federal government's ignominious use of 
hunger as a weapon of war against the seceding Biafrans. 
26 Until the transfer to Ahuja in the mid-1990s, Lagos was the official capital and seat 
of government. In moving the capital to Ahuja, the country's political leadership was 
guided by considerations that included centrality and the need to cite the capital in a loca-
tion not too strongly associated, as Lagos was, with any ethnic group. 
?!I Military governments in Nigeria cannot survive without promising to return power 
to civilians and then following that promise with the appearance of an earnest effort to 
transition to a civil rule program. 
28 Reflecting on the dilemma of democracy in Nigeria in 1996, one Nigerian political 
scholar pointed out that the country has had a long history of political experiments, "in-
spired by the finest democratic ideals," with, unfortunately, nothing to show for it but "a 
ravaged economy, a poorly functioning state, and recurrent social upheavals." See Richard 
Joseph, Nigeria: Inside the Dismal Tunne~ 95 CURRENT HI ST. 194,200 (1996). 
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Table 1 
Nigerian Governments from Abubakar Balewa to Olusegun Obasanjo 
Period of Rule Name of Ruler Gov'tType Ethnicity How Rule ended 
1960-1966 f'\bubakar Balewa ~ivilian Hausa Attempted 
oup jAssassination 
1966 ~uivi Ironsi Militarv 11!:bo "oup/ Assassination 
1966-1975 ~akubu Gowon ~ilitary Middle Belt Coup 
1975-1976 ~urtala Muhammed ~ilitary Hausa Attempted 
oup/ Assassination 
1976-1979 Olus~un Obasanio Militarv ~oruba Election 
1979-1983 ~hehu Shal!:ari Civilian fulani b oup 
1984-1985 ~.Buhari ~ilitary fulani Coup 
1985-1993 . Babangida ~ilitary ~inority Stepped down following 
Group in 
iNil!:er State 
~lection nullification 
1993 :Ernest Shonekan ~ivilian Yoruba Head of interim 
I!:overnment 
1993-1998 SaniAbacha ~ilitarv Kanuri Death bv heart attack 
1998-1999 ~.Abubakar ~litarv Middle Belt Election 
1999- Olusegun Obasanio ~ivilian Yoruba 
Source: FRYNAS, supra note 12, at 43. 
The first attempt at democratic rule lasted little more than five 
years.29 A second try lasted just over four years,30 while a projected 
third republic was still-born in 1993 when the military government 
under General Ibrahim Babangida annulled an election he himself 
had conducted.31 The present government, which is led by retired 
military general Olusegun Obasanjo, represents the country's fourth 
attempt at democratic governance (and as Table 1 indicates, this is 
Obasanjo's second time in office as political leader) . Briefly, four gen-
erals preceded Obasanjo. The first, Muhammadu Buhari, would not 
even entertain the notion of handing power over to a democratically 
elected government. He was removed from office in a palace coup in 
1985. The second, Babangida, pledged to hand power over to civil-
29 For an assessment of the country's first experiment with democracy or First Repub-
lic, see generally LARRY DIAMOND, CLASS, ETHNICITY, AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: THE 
FAILURE OF THE FIRST REpUBLIC (1988). 
30 For an assessment of this second experiment with democracy or Second Republic 
from 1979 to 1983, see, for example, RICHARD A. JOSEPH, DEMOCRACY AND PREBENDAL 
POLITICS IN NIGERIA: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SECOND REpUBLIC (1987) and TOYIN 
FALOLA & JULIUS IHONVBERE, THE RISE AND FALL OF NIGERIA'S SECOND REpUBLIC 1979-
1984 (1985). 
~l See, e.g., TRANSITION WITHOUT END: NIGERIAN POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER 
BABANGIDA 9 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1997). 
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ians, and designed a complex transition program but changed the 
date for the transfer of power many times.32 Finally, in 1993, after 
many years driving a society broken by unceasing economic hardship, 
Babangida held a comparatively free and fair election which he, how-
ever, quickly annulled because he did not like the result.33 He left 
office in August 1993 under the cloud of controversy generated by the 
annulment, leaving power in the hands of an interim government. 
The third leader to precede Obasanjo, Sani Abacha, was the most 
crudely repressive of them all. He took over in November 1993 and 
remained in office until his death in June 1998. Not until the fourth 
leader, Abdulsami Abubakar was power finally transferred to civilians 
in May 1999. 
Because of the failed transfers of power under these Nigerian 
generals, Nigeria lacks an experience of democracy of the kind of 
depth upon which a study like this can draw. Of its forty-one years of 
independent existence, Nigeria has spent approximately three dec-
ades under military rule and only eleven years, including the present 
Obasanjo period, under civilian rule. The Obasanjo government, like 
the Second Republic government in power from 1979 to 1983, is 
based on a federal constitution patterned after the u.S. system of gov-
ernment that is characterized by an executive branch headed by a 
president, a bicameral legislative assembly, an independent judiciary, 
and guarantees of basic rights. Since 1999, political power in Nigeria 
has been shared by three political parties. One of these three, the 
People's Democratic Party (PDP), General Obasanjo's party, controls 
the presidency and both houses of the National Assembly. 
c. Ethnicity and Religion 
One notable feature which has characterized politics and society 
in Nigeria since independence is ethnicity.34 Expressions of ethnicity 
S2 Political observers appropriately condemned the Babangida transition program as 
"one of the most sustained exercises in political chicanery ever visited on a people." See 
Diamond, supra note II, at 443. 
ss The election Babangida annulled was presumably won by Chief Moshood Abiola. A 
Yoruba business tycoon, Abiola was charged with treason and imprisoned by the military 
government under General Abacha after he proceeded to declare himself president. He 
died in prison. 
S4 For a more elaborate discussion of the origins and effects of ethnicity on politics 
and society in Nigeria, see Philip C. Aka, Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic 
&conciliation in the New Century, 141EMPu INT'L Be COMPo LJ. 327, 330-37 (2000). In Ni-
geria, ethnic groups are more commonly referred to as "tribes" and ethnicity as "tribal-
ism." 
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are frequently linked to exclusiveness, and most often "'accompanied 
by nepotism and corruption'" that is "'expressed inevitably through 
interethnic discrimination in jobs, housing, admissions into educa-
tional institutions, marriages, business transactions or the distribution 
of social welfare services.'"35 Nigeria's ethnic structure impedes rather 
than encourages inter-ethnic cooperation.36 One of numerous social 
cleavages which reinforce and magnify, rather than crosscut, ethnicity 
in the country is religion. Although adherents of Christianity and Is-
lam, Nigeria's two major religions, can be found in all parts of the 
country,37 most Hausa-Fulanis are Muslim, and most Igbos are Chris-
tian. The Yorubas are divided about equally between these two relig-
ions. The latest manifestation of ethnic-religious conflict in the coun-
try has resulted from the adoption of Islamic Sharia law in many of 
the country's northern states. By June 2001, eleven out of nineteen 
northern states had implemented Sharia law. Until this implementa-
tion, Sharia was a customary law applied only as civil law in the North. 
The more widespread adoption of this law, which involves replacing 
both civil and criminal legal systems with Muslim law, has led to 
deadly conflicts between Muslims and Christians in various parts of 
the country, resulting in the loss of lives and property. Approximately 
10,000 people have died from violence traceable to ethnic-religious 
conflict since General Obasa~o took office.38 
Many observers correctly view these states' adoption of Sharia law 
as politically motivated attempts by Hausa-Fulani leaders to under-
mine the strength of Obasanjo's administration, whose policies they 
consider unfavorable to northern interests.39 Manifestation of region-
alism in the country includes a northern fear of a "southern tyranny 
of skills" matched by a southern fear of a northern "tyranny of popu-
lation."4O One reason for Nigeria'S progressive division and subdivi-
35 GRAF, supra note 20, at 14 (quoting OKWUDIBA NNOLI, ETHNIC POLITICS IN NIGERIA 
(1978) ). 
36 See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 39 (1985). 
37 See Aka, supra note 34, at 334 n.61. 
38 See Talking Point, Interview by Robin Lustig with Olusegun Obasanjo, President, Ni-
geria, Ahuja, Nig. (Feb. 16,2002) (on file with author). 
39 See Minabere Ibelema, Nigeria: The Politics of Marginalization, 99 CURRENT HIST. 211, 
213 (2000). The use of geographic adjectives and references to geography in analysis of 
Nigerain politics testifies to the continuing negative influence of regional divisions in the 
country. One major way this social cleavage manifests itself is a northern fear of the south-
ern advantage in eduction ("tyranny of skills"), matched by a southern fear of a nothern 
advantage in population ("tyranny of population"). 
40 See RICHARD JOSEPH ET AL., Nigeria, in INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
570 (Mark Kesselman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (quoting J. Isawa Elaigwu, The Nigerian Fed-
234 Boston College Third World Law jfJUrnal [Vol. 22:225 
sion into greater numbers of states (from three regions in 1960 to 
thirty-six states in 1996)41 was to minimize the influence of ethnicity 
on the country's politics and to promote inter-ethnic cooperation. 
Every indication, however, including the recent manifestations of re-
ligion on the country's national life, suggests that these divisions have 
been to no avail.42 Unfortunately, the sole remaining issue to unite 
Nigerians, as a people, appears to be their common devotion to soc-
cer as a national pastime.43 Recent studies in political science have 
unveiled the role of trust in the formation and maintenance of a po-
litical system.44 The severity of Nigeria's ethnic conflicts appears to 
suggest that the country lacks the trust necessary to maintain society. 
D. Democratization 
1. A Government in Transition 
I designate the process of political change that has taken place in 
Nigeria since May 1999 as "democratization." This term refers to 
something ongoing and, as used here, signifies a transition away from 
dictatorial rule.45 It reflects political scientists' evaluation that changes 
in government, while important, do not always rise to the level of full-
fledged democracy;46 this view accords with those of analysts such as 
William Minter who assessed the struggle for democracy in Nigeria as 
still "unresolved. "47 While it is true that democracies are, by 
eration and Future Prospects, in NIGERIA: THE WAY FORWARD 32-33 (Omafume Onoge ed., 
1993». 
41 See FRYNAS, supra note 12, at 45. 
42 For an assessment of the limitations of state creation as a tool for minimizing ethnic 
conflict in Nigeria, see Eghosa E. Osaghae, Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided 
Society: The Nigerian Experience, 36]. MOD. AFR. STUD. 1, 1-24 (1998). 
45 See Nigeria, supra note 8, at 55 (holding out the success of its athletes, especially its 
world class soccer team, as among the few achievements of the country). 
44 See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS (2002). 
45 EARL CONTEH-MORGAN, DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: THE THEORY AND DYNAMICS 
OF POUTICAL TRANSITIONS 6 (1997). 
46 See Marina Ottaway, From Political opening to Democratization?, in DEMOCRACY IN AF-
RICA: THE HARD ROAD AHEAD 1-14 (Marina Ottaway ed. 1997) (questioning the deep-
rooted nature of the changes in Africa). See general:y MARINA OTTAWAY, AFRICA'S NEW 
LEADERS: DEMOCRACY OR STATE RECONSTRUCTION? (1999) (expressing a similarly negative 
attitude towards the changes in Africa). One writer, focusing on human rights, maps out a 
route to democracy that is preceded by two steps, namely, democratization and economic 
liberalization. See generall:y MAHMOOD MONSHIPOURI, DEMOCRATIZATION, UBERAUZATION 
& HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE THIRD WORLD (1995). 
47 William Minter, America and Africa: Beyond the Double Standard, 99 CURRENT HIST. 
200, 208 (2000). This conclusion is warranted as there remain many unresolved issues in 
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definition, works in progress-journeys as opposed to final destina-
tions48-some democracies appear to be farther from their destination 
than others. A transfer of power from one soldier to a former sol-
dier,49 in an economy rocked by official corruption and crushing aus-
terity measures,50 does not a true democracy make.51 
A primary factor leading to this still-transitional assessment of 
Nigerian democracy under General Obasanjo is the tenuous character 
of the popular support for his leadership. Of Nigeria's former three 
regions and main ethnic groups, Obasanjo won heavily in two, the 
North and East, but he and his party failed to carry the Yoruba West.52 
In effect, as one analyst points out, "Obasanjo became the first Nige-
rian to be elected to the presidency without the support of his own 
ethnic group."53 This fact is especially noteworthy because it has com-
promised the president's ability to pursue policies he considers inclu-
sive and equitable,54 but which Hausa-Fulani leaders consider unfa-
Nigeria's struggle for democracy. Id. at 205-06. These issues include regional and ethnic 
inequality, division of governmental powers, and revenue allocation. Id. 
48 Vaclav Havel, former president of Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic, 
once argued that even democratic veterans like the United States do nothing but merely 
approach democracy: 
As long as people are people, democracy in the full sense of the word, will al-
ways be no more than an ideal. In this sense, you too are merely approaching 
democracy. But you have one great advantage: you have been approaching 
democracy uninterruptedly for more than 200 years, and your journey toward 
the horizon has never been disrupted by a totalitarian system. 
LARRY BERMAN & BRUCE A. MuRPHY, APPRoACHING DEMOCRACY 3 (2d ed. 1999); see also 
President William]. Clinton, Address to aJoint Session of the Nigerian National Assembly 
(Aug. 26, 2000), available at http://usembassy.state.gov /nigeria/wwwhclin.html. 
49 See TRANSITION WITHOUT END: NIGERIAN POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER BA-
BANGIDA (Larry Diamond ed., 1997) (focusing on the cruelty of Babangida's failed transi-
tion to democracy); see also Pita O. Agbese, Nigeria: How to Derail a Transition Program, in 
MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL CHANGE: CONSTRAINTS TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN 
AFRICA 123,124 (John Mukum Mbaku &Julius O. Ihonvbere eds., 1998). 
50 Robert Guest, A Survey of Nigeria, ECONOMIsT,Jan. 15,2000, at 1, 3-6. 
51 See Donald Rothchild, Conclusion: Management of Conflict in West Africa, in GOVERN-
ANCE AS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 197, 222 (1. William Zartman ed., 1997) (stating that 
"[t]he presence of democracy cannot be determined by one set of multiparty elections; 
rather it must be viewed as a developmental process over time"). 
52 See Ibelema, supra note 39, at 213. 
53Id. Cf Guest, supra note 50, at 15 (indicating that because he "drew most of his elec-
toral support from non-Yorubas," Obasanjo "is one of the few Nigerian politicians whose 
loyalties are not determined by his tribal origins"). For an interesting explanation of 
Yoruba attitudes toward Obasanjo and previous Yoruba leaders, see Bayo Onanuga, The 
Yoruba Complex, THENEWS (Lagos) ,June 7,1999, at 3. 
541belema, supra note 39, at 213. 
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vorable to the north.55 The result has been the widespread adoption 
of Islamic Sharia law in the northern states, increasing ethnic-
religious violence and complicating governance for General Oba-
sanjo.56 Although the greatest challenge to his rule comes now from 
the north, as this Article will demonstrate shortly, popular support for 
Obasanjo is also slipping in the east and among minorities in both the 
South and North of the country. 
Another factor that contributes to the characterization of Nige-
ria's political situation as transitional is the heavy militarized nature of 
the Obasanjo government.57 Since taking office, General Obasal1io 
has failed to adjust his leadership style to the tenets and imperatives of 
civil-democratic rule. Democratic consolidation is, in the parlance of 
conflict management, "the process of progressive elimination or 
minimization of force and coercion, extreme repression, and related 
negative conflict management techniques antithetical to democ-
racy. "58 No such minimization of force has occurred under Oba-
sanjo.59 Additionally, as his frosty relationship with the National As-
sembly illustrates, General Obasanjo tends to command, rather than 
conciliate or compromise.60 
55 As Minabere Ibelema points out, although the North historically lags behind the 
rest of the country in educational and industrial development, Hausa-Fulanis, as an ethnic 
group, have exercised political leadership through much of Nigeria's post<olonial history. 
Hausa-Fulani leaders believed northern votes put Obasanjo in office and that his election, 
to begin with, was a "concession ~ to the Yorubas designed to rectify the northern military 
establishment's nullification of the 1993 election, presumed to have been won by Chief 
Abiola, who was Yoruba. Id. 
56 Id. at 212 (arguing that "[a]lthough the present crisis is veiled in religious differ-
ences, it is at root political~). 
57 In the wake of the killings of over 200 Tivs in the Middle Belt by Nigerian soldiers, it 
was reported that Nigeria's President, Director of National Security, Defense Minister and 
Director of the State Security Service (national intelligence) are all retired military per-
sons. SeeJohn Chiahemen, Nigerian Democracy Wobbles, Army's Profile Rises, Reuters, Oct. 29, 
2001 (on file with author) (citing Reverend Father Matthew Hassan Kuka, a respected 
Nigerian social commentator and member of a human rights commission that Obasanjo 
impaneled). The Nigerian experience since 1999 indicates that one central component of 
a healthy democracy is missing: a civilian presence in the government. 
58 Aka, supra note 34, at 354; see also Richard Joseph, Nigeria and tlui Challenge of Leader-
ship, TELL (Lagos) ,July 5,1999, at 48,49 (arguing that the political system must be demili-
tarized in order for Nigeria to beome a constitutional democracy). 
59 See Chiahemen, supra note 57 (quoting Nigerian attorney and social crusader Gani 
Fawehinmi's suggestion that Obasanjo's civilian government brings back bad memories of 
past military rule in Nigeria). 
60 Ellen Nakashima, Villagers in Nigeria Welcome Clinton Visit, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 28, 
2000, at 24. The New York Times recently assessed that General Obasanjo's carriage and the 
record of his domestic performance three years in to his term leave the roots of democracy 
still "shallow~ in the country. See Troubled Times in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2002, at A20. 
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If, as some scholars suggest, democratic consolidation occurs 
when "democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate and 
so habitually practiced and observed that it is very unlikely to break 
down, "61 the present political situation in Nigeria is nowhere near 
democratic consolidation.62 One perceptive u.s. analyst foresaw these 
problems, remarking upon the questionable fairness of the 1999 elec-
tion, Obasanjo's military background, and "his apparent initial as-
sump~on that input from pro-<iemocracy, human rights, and other 
grassroots groups is no longer necessary .... ''63 The analyst con-
cluded, "[t]he temptation to rely primarily on repression rather than 
dialogue is still a major threat. ''64 This comment has turned out to be 
prophetic indeed. 
2. Internal Conflict, External Consequences 
As one Nigerianjournalist noted, "[o]nly a people confident and 
a government strong at home can engage the rest of the world. "65 
Given the strong connection between domestic and foreign policy, the 
political situation within the borders of Nigeria necessarily affects re-
lations with the United States and other foreign countries.66 With the 
61 Larry Diamond et al., Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?, in POUTICS IN DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY 53 (Larry Diamond et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 1995); see also John S. Dryzek, Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratiza-
tion, 90 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 475, 475-87 (Sept. 1996) (characterizing democracy as political 
inclusion). 
62 The issue of the "quality" of Nigerian democracy is at times a sore spot for General 
Obasanjo, who is not known for his good temper. The following illustrates his reaction to a 
reporter's description of Nigerian democracy as something that "continues to struggle to 
get off the ground:" 
[I]t's a new one on me that Nigerian democracy is struggling to get off the-
ground .... I am learning that from you; now that you have told me, I will 
have to go back to President Bush and ask him to come and help me get Ni-
gerian democracy off the ground .... We are not struggling; we are a matur-
ing democracy .... Nigerian democracy has gotten off the ground. 
Charles Cobb Jr. & Reed Kramer, Our Democracy is Working-Obasanjo, THISDAY, May 19, 
2001, at 13. 
63 Minter, supra note 47, at 206. 
64 Id. 
63 Reuben Abati, What is Obasanjo s Foreign Policy?, GUARDIAN ONUNE (Lagos), Aug. 29, 
1999 (on file with author); see also PETER CALVERT, THE FOREIGN POUCY OF NEW STATES, 
at viii (1986) (maintaining that foreign policy is "ancillary to domestic policy and serves its 
needs"). 
66 Id. 
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numerosity of economic and centrifugal problems at home, 67 Nigeri-
ans and their government now lack this much-needed internal 
confidence.68 Democracy has yet to produce any economic dividend 
for the masses.69 Over 10,000 people have died from ethnic-religious 
conflicts70 and other causes71 since General Obasanjo took office. 
Compounding these matters is the fact that his government is devel-
oping a reputation for being aloof and uncaring.72 In short, the 
shambled nature of the country's internal organization threatens its 
place and image in the international community.73 Countries also 
need domestic strength to weather or stem the forces of globaliza-
tion.74 More specifically, the country's growing domestic weakness 
minimizes its chances of conducting "genuinely reciprocal and mutu-
67 See, e.g.,Ibelema, supra note 39, at 211-14 (analyzing the climate of ethno-religious 
tensions in the country occasioned by the declaration or implementation of Islamic Sharia 
law by some northern states and the cry of marginalization by both major and minor eth-
nic groups in the country); Chiahemen, supra note 57 (commenting on the "unprece-
dented level of violence" in the country, including the massacre in Benue State, necessitat-
ing the placement of about half a dozen Nigerian cities under a military-enforced curfew). 
68 Abati, supra note 65. 
69 See, e.g., Tayo Adesanya, Road Map to Economic Growth, THENEWS (Lagos), July 3, 
2000 (stating that "the Nigerian economy is in [a] coma" and surmising that "[t]here is no 
doubt that Nigerians are becoming desperate by the day"); Ausbeth J\jagu, The Economy 
and Exchange Rate, TmSDAY, Aug. 7, 2001, at 12 (pointing out the continued weakness of 
the national currency, the Naira, in relation to the U.S. dollar); Lynda Ikpeazu, Democracy 
and the Underprivikged, VANGUARD (Lagos),July 17, 2001, at 29 (noting that democracy has 
yielded no economic dividend for ordinary Nigerians); NkiIuka Obiajulu, Workers and 
National Economy Policy, THISDAY, Aug. 7, 2001, at 12 (indicating that although the gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew modestly, no visible improvement occurred in living stan-
dards); Ayodele Teriba & Bayo Adeitan, The Nigerian Economy in 2000, TmSDAY, July 17, 
2001, at2. 
70 See TafAing Point, supra note 38. 
71 For example, in January 2002, an antiquated military arms depot exploded in a 
densely populated area of Lagos, killing more than 1,000. See Toll in Blast at Nigerian Armory 
Exceeds 1,000, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,2002, at 6. 
72 See Troubkd Times in Nigeria, supra note 60; Norimitsu Onishi, Blast Further Erodes Ni-
gerians' Confidence, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10,2002, at 6. 
73 SeeABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 253 (pointing out that the country's global 
position "has been compromised in recent years by her economic weakness, by the low 
legitimacy of her rulers both internally and abroad, and by the deepening fault lines along 
her regional and religious boundaries"); CHINUA ACHEBE, THE ThOUBLE WITH NIGERIA 42 
(1983) (decrying numerous vices, including the "bold and ravenous" political corruption, 
that plague the country). See generally OSAGHAE, supra note 20. The worrisome thing about 
Nigeria is that "[i]n comparison to other countries with equivalent natural resources, pool 
of skilled human resources, and size, [the country] has not done well." ABORISADE & 
MUNDT, supra note 6, at 245; see also Guest, supra note 50, at 5 (comparing the country with 
Indonesia) . 
74 See generally Stephen Wright, The Changing Context of African Foreign Policies, in AFRI-
CAN FOREIGN POUCIES 1-22 (Stephen Wright ed., 1999). 
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ally beneficial"75 relations with the United States. Given the quick-
sand-like bases of support for the Obasanjo government and the 
country's extensive internal weakness, it seems that U.S. policymakers 
should work toward "fundamental institutional change[s]" rather 
than attempt to build fragile American-style policy around "new lead-
ers" like Obasanjo.76 
II. TENSIONS AND MOTIVATIONS UNDERLYING U.S.-NIGERIAN 
RELATIONS 
In order to fully develop and evaluate the nature of U.S. foreign 
policy relating to Nigerian democracy, this study begins by bringing 
certain underlying tensions and motivations to light. This section ad-
dresses critics' fundamental concerns about external support of Mri-
can democratization efforts, both generally and with particular atten-
tion to the United States and Nigeria. It also discusses the economic 
and social interests at stake for both countries and the consequences 
of this reciprocity. 
A. Tensions Regarding External Assistance for African Democratiz.ation 
Nations must develop themselves or will not be developed 
at all.77 As one Mrican proverb goes, no serious traveler depends en-
tirely on the legs of another person for his journey.78 Critics of inter-
national support for Mrican democratization efforts are primarily 
concerned about entrusting a critical stage of the country's political 
development79 to foreign nations. These critics urge that Mricans 
cannot depend solely or heavily on external actors, particularly the 
United States and other western countries, to realize their democratic 
aspirations.8o 
75 Minter, supra note 47, at 210. 
76 See id. at 206. 
77 BASIL DAVIDSON, MODERN AnuCA: A SOCIAL AND POUTICAL HISTORY 265-68 (3d 
ed.1994). 
78 DR. F. JEFFRESS RAMSAY, Africa: The Struggle for Development, in GLOBAL STUDIES: AF-
RICA, supra note 8, at 3, 9. 
79 For a collection of essays on the meaning and complexity of the political develop-
ment concept, see generally UNDERSTANDING POUTICAL DEVELOPMENT (Myron Weiner & 
Samuel P. Huntington eds., 1987). 
80 See Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, 19th Annual Meet-
ing, Association of Third World Studies, Inc., Savannah Ga. (Oct. 13,2001) (transcript on 
file with author). 
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While such thinking has some merit, it incorrectly characterizes 
external support. Foreign support could be seen to reinforce rather 
than to detract or compromise self-development. The African proverb 
warns only about depending solely on others' legs.81 Countries have 
ultimate ownership and responsibility for their own self-development, 
but external assistance is not necessarily contrary to this goal. As Gen-
eral Obasanjo argued during a spring 2001 interview, although Nige-
rian democracy "is essentially our own," "development partners" such 
as the United States can contribute to bringing about the "democracy 
dividend" that will make Nigerian democracy more firm.82 Obasanjo 
characterized the "democracy dividend" as an opportunity for "get-
ting resources to deal with essential quality of life enhancement in our 
own society .... "83 This definition connotes the usefulness of external 
support given that, as is often the case in Africa, the resources needed 
to enhance quality of life cannot be entirely generated at home. 
Fledgling democracies are fragile constructs that have difficulty 
surviving in a "hostile environment.,,84 External support can minimize 
such fragility along with the internal conflict and violence that 
threaten these political systems. It is in due recognition of this fact 
that the literature regarding consolidation of the latest wave of de-
mocracy in the world85 routinely integrates a discussion of the issue of 
international support.86 Thirdly, even the very meaning of foreign pol-
icy connotes the idea of assisting rather than co-opting another na-
81 For an illustration of such sole dependence, rising to the level of abdication of own-
ership for one's own self-development, see Dr. Julius O. Ihonvbere, Panel on Western 
Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80 (recounting the example of an 
unnamed African democratic leader who came to Washington in search of "democratic 
support" with a delegation of more than sixty members). 
82 Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62. 
83 Id. (emphasis added). 
84 See Paul N. Ndue, Africa's Turn Toward Pluralism, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES: INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS, U.S. FOREIGN POllCY, AND THE VIEW FROM ABROAD 293, 302 (David 
Lai ed., 1997). 
85 The idea of waves in the evolution of democracies in the world is taken from SAM-
UEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TwENTIETH CEN-
TURY (1991); see also Philippe Schmitter, The International Context of Contemporary De1TU)crati-
zation, 2 STAN.]. INT'LAF'FAIRS 1, 13-19 (1993) (finding, unlike Huntington, four waves). 
86 See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 270; Larry Diamond, Introduction: In Search ofCon-
solidation, in CONSOllDATING THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES, at xxxvii (Larry Diamond et 
aI. eds., 1997); Laurence Whitehead, Concerning International Support for Democracy in the 
South, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE SoUTH: THE JAGGED WAVE 243, 243-73 (Robin Luck-
ham & Gordon White eds., 1996); see also Larry Diamond, Restoring Democracy in Africa, 
USA TODAY (Magazine),Jan. 1, 1998, reprinted in GLOBAL STUDIES: AnuCA, supra note 78, 
at 178, 178-80; Diamond et aI., supra note 61, at 48-52. 
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tion's democracy building. These policies entail "the pursuit of vital 
domestic interests beyond [a country's] own boundaries"87 and can 
both reflect and magnify domestic policies.88 Through foreign policy, 
African states are able to engage important external actors "in the 
search for solutions to domestic problems."89 Foreign policy is only 
effective if it can both anticipate and minimize possible negative con-
sequences of exerting external force on domestic programs.90 
Critics also contend that "externally assisted democratization,,91 
cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of sovereignty, which asserts 
that every country, regardless of its size, is the unquestioned master of 
its internal affairs and forbids other countries from interfering with 
those affairs.92 As one analyst inquired, is international intrusion on 
African domestic affairs "a new form of imperialism or the harbinger 
of new conflict between Africa and the West?"93 This Article contends 
that it need be neither one. The Universal Declaration of Human 
87 James Zaffiro, Exceptionality in External Affairs: Botswana in the African and Global Are-
nas, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POUCIES, supra note 74, at 66, 78. 
88 SeeAbati, supra note 65 (stating, inter alia, that "[d]omestic policy must be the start-
ing point. Only a government that is strong at home can engage the rest of the world."). 
89 Assis Malaquias, Angola: The Foreign Policy of a Decaying State, in AFRICAN FOREIGN 
POUCIES, supra note 74, at 23, 23. 
90 In a study on human rights during the Babangida period, Professor Pita O. Agbese 
shows how external forces can abridge democracy and how removing those forces can en-
hance the chances of success for democracy. Pita O. Agbese, The State versus Human Rights 
Advocates in Africa: The Case of Nigeria, in AFRICA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 
147, 152 (Eileen McCarthy-Arnolds et al. eds., 1994). Agbese blames Babangida's turn-
around with respect to these rights on the conditions necessary to implement the Struc-
tural Adjustment Program (SAP). Id, There was little chance that Nigerians would consent 
to the stringent budgetary cutbacks and fiscal controls that SAP entailed. Id. at 153. Ac-
cordingly, once Babangida determined that the program was necessary, he had little 
choice but to muzzle public opinion and terminate any challenge to his policies, even as 
he called for a national debate on the issue. Id. at 147, 152-56. Agbese concludes, persua-
sively in my view, that the external forces pushing SAP conditions on Nigeria effectively 
served to impede Nigerian democratization. Id. at 168. Without meaning to rationalize 
Babangida's cruel chicanery, the absence or minimization of those pressures could have 
represented positive support for political changes in Nigeria. Id. For assessment of SAPs 
similar to Professor Agbese's, see NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL., POUTICS AND SOCIETY IN CON-
TEMPORARY AFRICA 342-43 (3d ed. 1999) (arguing that basic elements in these programs 
were "prudent and necessary" given that many African economies needed adjustment, but 
that "the process of adjustment" was faulty in several dimensions). 
91 John W. Harbeson, Externally Assisted Democratization: Theoretical Issues and African Re-
alities, in AFRICA IN WORLD POUTICS: THE AFRICAN STATE IN FLUX 235, 235-62 (John W. 
Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 2000). 
9ll For a concise elaboration of the doctrine of sovereignty, see, for example,JosHuA S. 
GoLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 77-79 (3d ed. 1999); BRUCE RUSSETT ET AL., 
WORLD POUTIcs: THE MENU FOR CHOICE 49-52 (6th ed. 2000). 
9$ Diamond, supra note 1, at 271. 
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Rights (UDHR) stipulates that every individual has the right to "social 
security" realized "through national effort and international coopera-
tion. ''94 Efforts to promote democratization exemplify the kind of in-
ternational cooperation that contributes to this feeling of social secu-
rity within one's own country. The generous package of assistance 
extended to western European countries under the Marshall Plan af-
ter World War II rehabilitated their war-torn economies and helped 
build rather than inhibit the progress of democracy.95 Africa received 
no such help even though its devastation and deprivation rival that 
which Europe experienced as a result of World War 11.96 At a mini-
mum, international assistance is justified in that it enables democratiz-
ing "countries to address and mitigate discontinuities that [prior] ex-
ternal pressures for reform may have helped to exacerbate. "97 Indeed, 
international assistance "opens new opportunities for partnership in 
the search for development, social justice, and peaceful resolution of 
conflict in Mrica. ''98 As commentators argue, rather than pose an in-
terventionist dilemma, properly implemented external support can 
advance democratization and lead to a more peaceful world.99 
94 UDHR, GA. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., art 22 U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948) (emphasis added). The UDHR equates this right to social security as "eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights" required by every individual in order to promote "his 
dignity and the free development of his personality." Id. 
95 The Marshall Plan amounted to over $12 billion by 1952. POWASKI, supra note 2, at 
73. 
96 See Adebayo Adedeji, Introduction: Marginalization and Marginality: Context, Issues and 
Viewpoints, in AFRICA WITIUN THE WORLD: BEYOND DISPOSSESSION AND DEPENDENCE 1, 5 
(Adebayo Adedeji ed., 1993); see also Kurt C. Campbell & Thomas G. Weiss, The Third World 
in the Wake of Eastern Europe, 14 WASH. U. L.Q. 91, 95 (1991) (denoting the "enormous 
reconstruction needs" in places like the Horn of Africa and southern Africa "where the 
superpowers played out their rivalries"); Ali A. Mazrui, Global Africa: From Abolitionists to 
Reparationists, 37 AFR. STUD. REv. 1, 7 (1994). 
97 Harbeson, supra note 91, at 241. 
98 Diamond, supra note 1, at 271-72. 
99 Harbeson, supra note 91, at 244. Diamond built this belief on his view that democ-
racy is vital to the attainment of a "more just, peaceful, and stable world order, based on a 
global rule of law." Diamond, supra note 1, at 269. As he explains: 
[D]emocratic countries do not go to war with one another or sponsor terror-
ism against other democracies ... do not build weapons of mass destruction 
to threaten one another ... are more reliable, open, and enduring trading 
partners, and offer more stable climates for investments; are more environ-
mentally responsible [given that they must answer to their own citizens] ... 
more likely to honor international treaties and value legal obligations [given 
that their openness makes it much more difficult to breach these agreements 
in secret] ... [and are a] reliable foundation on which to build a new world 
order of security and prosperity [given that they respect civil liberties, rights 
of property, and the rule oflawwithin their own borders]. 
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B. Tensions Regarding U.S. Assistance for Nigerian Democratization 
Those who object to U.S. support for Nigerian democratization 
efforts do so on two discernible grounds. First, critics are quick to 
point out the United States' sorry record with respect to its past sup-
port for democracy in Africa.l°o These critics suggest that America 
may be engaging in its same old "cynical calculations, "101 advancing 
national interest under the guise of promoting democracy. Given this 
history, critics argue, Nigerians or other Africans blatantly delude 
themselves in relying on the United States to help them realize de-
mocracy in their countries.102 Although Nigerians have no way to be 
certain of what may truly motivate the United States to support de-
mocratization in Nigeria, scholars such as Larry Diamond have rightly 
commented that U.S. foreign policy of the past and at present is sepa-
rated by markedly different eras.103 The United States' inconsistent 
record of democracy building during the Cold War does not necessar-
ily indicate that it will pay the same lip service to democracy in the 
post-Cold War era. These themes will be developed in greater detail in 
later sections of this Article. 
Critics' second objection to U.S. interference in Nigeria relates to 
what they consider the shallow nature of U.S. democracy when trans-
ferred to other nations. Democracy is not simply about, for example, 
elections and "protection of free markets. "104 Critics worry that the 
United States will only be able to export a minimalistic, election-
happy construct of democracy,105 when what Nigeria and other Afri-
can countries need is an enriched, more meaningful system that re-
sponds to African conditions and is sensitive to the needs of various 
groups in the society.1oo Nigeria needs, they contend, a democracy 
Id. at 269-70. 
100 Id. at 250-5l. 
101 Id. at 250. Historical examples of these calculations would include the U.S. gov-
ernment's support for Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko and the white minority regime in South 
Africa. 
102 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Mrica, supra note 80. 
103 According to Diamond, the new political context is characterized by the absence of 
Soviet military and political influence and the spread of ideologies and economic systems 
hostile to U.S. interests. Diamond, supra note 1, at 253. 
104 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does Globalization Advance Human Rights? 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 
125,139 (1999). 
105 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Mrica, supra note 80. 
106 Id.; see also CONTEH-MORGAN, supra note 45, at 6 (describing democracy as "a proc-
ess of establishing a form of governance in which mechanisms are created to ensure par-
ticipation at all levels of politics, responsible leadership, and civil liberties") ; John Mukum 
Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction to MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND POUTICAL 
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that goes beyond ritualistic symbols such as free and fair elections 
that, while important, by themselves amount to little change.I07 These 
fears appear to be ill founded, however, because no major nation in 
our time has developed a democracy without adapting it to suit local 
circumstances. lOS Democracy, if and when it finally comes to Nigeria 
and other Mrican countries, will be homegrown and responsive to the 
needs of each countryl09 or else the system will not survive. 
Although individual countries may be under no moral obligation 
to follow through with the articulated goals of their foreign policies,l1o 
those that do keep their promises project an aura of credibility in 
their dealings with other nations.1l1 The United States has long dem-
onstrated a desire to win the "hearts and minds" of Third World1l2 
peoples, Africans included, with offers of economic assistance.113 
American leaders, such as President Kennedy, have asserted that this 
policy has been developed not out of self-interest, but "because it is 
right. "114 U.S. sincerity is also bolstered by the fact that American 
CHANGE, supra note 49, at 1, 4-7 (listing critical themes an enriched notion of democracy 
must cover). 
107 Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Africa, supra note 80; see also 
Julius O. Ihonvbere, How Not to Consolidate a Democracy: The Experience of the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia, in MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY AND POUTICAL 
CHANGE, supra note 49, at 219, 221. 
108 See ROLF H. W. THEEN & FRANK L. WILSON, COMPARATIVE POUTICS: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES 3, 4 (4th ed. 2001) (containing chapters dealing with the evolu-
tion of democracy in Britain, France, Germany, andJapan). 
109 See THoMAS M. MAGSTADT, NATIONS AND GOVERNMENTS: COMPARATIVE POUTICS IN 
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 447 (3d ed. 1998). "When and if real democracy does come to sub-
Saharan Africa, it will most likely bear a 'made in Africa' imprint." [d. But Magstadt makes 
his statement tongue-in<heek, reviewing the complex evolution of democracy in African 
countries since 1990. This assessment, unlike his, is positive in tone. 
llO See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 92, at 53-54. 
III See, e.g., id. at 289 (stating that "[t]he rules that govern most interactions in 
I[nternational] R[elations] are rooted in moral norms" and that "morality is an element of 
power"). 
ll2 The appellation "Third World" designates a large category of countries at varying 
stages of economic development that are considered neither part of the First World of 
industrialized capitalist states nor of the Second World of socialist countries. Cold War 
terminology that, with the demise of most of the socialist world and with the advent of the 
post-Cold War, has lost much of its original meaning and utility. The word is used today 
only out of habit and for convenience, as here, to designate developing countries. 
113 Jorge Heiene & Juan M. Garda-Passalacqua, Political Economy and Foreign Policy in 
Puerto Rico, in MODERN CARIBBEAN POUTICS 198, 205 (Anthony Payne & Paul Sutton eds., 
1993). 
ll4 "To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the 
bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves . . . not 
because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is 
right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are 
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leaders consistently espouse that promoting democracy suppresses 
violence between nations, which is good for both the United States 
and the world at large. l15 The proliferation of democracy engenders 
certainty and predictability in an exceedingly complex and sometimes 
chaotic world, which also facilitates the conduct of American foreign 
policy. As one State Department official remarked, the growth of de-
mocractic systems is both idealpolitik and realpolitik with respect to 
the United States.1I6 Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Al-
bright stated that "America has a profound security and economic 
interest in helping to build an Africa that is stable, democratic and 
increasingly prosperous," and Nigeria, as a "regional partner[]," is a 
"'bellwether' nation. "117 
Additionally, U.S. foreign policy demonstrates a preference for 
political stability in any form. For instance, policymakers stuck with 
Zaire's General Mobutu Sese Seko almost to the very end because the 
country was "obsessed with a fear that [his fall] would bring 'the con-
sequent disintegration of Zaire into unstable segments open to radical 
penetration."'118 Similar concerns underlay the Reagan administra-
tion's "constructive engagement" policy toward South Africa and its 
collaboration with the apartheid regime in that country.1l9 Turning to 
Nigeria, some scholars have pointed out that one reason the United 
States failed to move decisively against the Abacha regime (by, for ex-
rich." 'THEODORE SORENSON, KENNEDY 246 (1965) (quoting President John F. Kennedy) 
(emphasis added). 
!15 See RUSSETT ET AL., supra note 92, at 289 (citing Presidents Woodrow Wilson and 
William]. Clinton). 
116 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHAL-
LENGES OF A NEW CENTURY, supra note 7, at 112, 118. 
117 Laolu Akande, U.S. Keen on Nigeria's Reforms as Obasanjo Visits, GUARDIAN ONLINE 
(Lagos) , Oct. 27, 1999 (on file with author). 
118 Diamond, supra note 1, at 251 (quoting from the memoirs of former U.S. Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance); see all'O James Ferguson, The I>uvalier Dictatorship and Its Legacy of 
Crisis in Haiti, in MODERN CARIBBEAN POLITICS, supra note 113, at 73, 82 (describing how 
the American government, worried about "the threat of political instability" in Haiti, 
aligned itself with repressive military leaders whom it saw as "the most feasible agent of 
gradual democratic change" and "the most obvious vehicle for stopping any revolutionary 
impetus"); Paul Sutton, U.S. Intervention, Regional Security, and Militarization in the Caribbean, 
in MODERN CARIBBEAN POLITICS, supra note 113, at 277, 283 (disclosing that the Reagan 
administration's invasion of Grenada was predicated on restoring stability in the country). 
119 See Chester Crocker, South Africa: Strategy for Change, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 323, 323-27 
(1980-81); see also CHESTER CROCKER, HIGH NOON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: MAKING PEACE 
IN A ROUGH NEIGHBORHOOD 74-82 (1992). Crocker was Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs in the Reagan administration and the architect of "constructive engage-
ment." Id. at 18, 75. For a mocking critique of this policy, see Michael Clough, The United 
States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement, 91 CURRENT HIST. 193, 193-98 (1992). 
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ample, boycotting Nigerian oil) was the multi-ethnic patchwork 
"complexity" of the country.120 General Sani Abacha, known for his 
knack for political survival, played to the American proclivity for "sta-
bility" by unveiling a massive public relations campaign in the United 
States, publicizing the '''political, economic, and social stability'" of 
his government.12l Political stability remains an important considera-
tion for the United States with respect to Nigeria.122 This goal may be 
problematic, however, where it causes U.S. policymakers to overlook a 
militarized, non-democratic regime because it appears politically sta-
ble. Governments not built on popular support are by their very na-
ture unstable: one unconstitutional militarized takeover begets an-
other. In offering assistance to Nigerian democratization efforts, U.S. 
policymakers should be mindful of the fact that it compromises pro-
motion of democracy when it hinges its support on the stability of 
undemocratic governments. 
C. The United States' Interest in Relations with Nigeria 
One story goes that Leopold II, King of Belgium from 1865 to 
1909, instructed a group of Belgian missionaries about to embark on 
an expedition to Mrica, to interpret the Gospel in a way that pro-
tected Belgian interests. Few foreign political actions are based en-
tirely in goodwill; they are more often rooted in prudence and practi-
cality.123 Although promoting democracy may, as was indicated earlier, 
be a sufficient national interest in and of itself, such idealistic abstrac-
tion is usually augmented by more concrete or material considera-
tions. This is certainly true for the United States. "Every nation," 
President Kennedy once noted, "determines its policies in terms of its 
own [national] interests. ,,124 As students of American foreign policy 
120 It is also possible, as Diamond points out, that Western countries have little leverage 
when it comes "to affect[ing] the political destiny of a relatively resourceful African coun-
try, even one so deep in debt and economic misery as Nigeria." Diamond, supra note 1, at 
261. 
121 ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 253. 
122 See Minter, supra note 47, at 206 (enumerating a focus on stability among the com-
mon policy elements in current U.S. relations with Africa); see also Daniel Volman, Africa 
and the New World Order, 31J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 1, 1 (1993) (observing a shift in the focus of 
U.S. security policy that includes among its goals "the struggle to preserve order"). 
123 See generally HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POWER AND PEACE (5th ed., rev. 1978) (arguing that world politics is governed by objective, 
universal laws that are based on national interest which is defined in terms of power). 
124 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 92, at 71 (citing President Kennedy'S address at the Mor-
mon Tabernacle in Salt Lake City, Utah on September 26, 1963). 
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have asserted, "[t]he tradition of American foreign policy encom-
passes both moral idealism and raw self-interests. "125 For instance, 
during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis in 1990-1991, U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker traveled around the world stitching together a coalition 
against Iraq based on the moral principle of stopping aggression and 
building a "New World Order." At the same time, Baker openly indi-
cated to U.S. reporters that the conflict was also "about jobs because 
cheap Middle Eastern oil would stimulate U.S. economic growth. "126 
The primacy of national interest overtaking the pursuit of ideals has 
deep roots in U.S. history. President Abraham Lincoln is fondly re-
ferred to by African Americans as the "great emancipator.,,127 Yet, Lin-
coln made black freedom (idealism) secondary to preserving the Un-
ion (national interest): 
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union 
.... If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I 
would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I 
would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leav-
ing others alone I would also do that. What I do about slav-
ery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to 
save the Union.128 
The United States' primary interest in relation to Nigeria is oil. 
As a voracious consumer of the country's "sweet" (i.e., low-sulfur) pe-
ItS CHARLES KEGLEY & EUGENE WITTKOPF, AMERICAN FOREIGN POUCY: PATTERNS AND 
PROCESS 78 (1987). 
126 GoLDSTEIN, supra note 92, at 186. Not even an exceedingly magnanimous act, such 
as the U.S. assistance to Europe under the Marshall Plan after World War II, is free from 
this general orientation of national interest calculation in U.S. policy. The Cold War 
played a major role in the design and introduction of the plan, with the U.S. fearing that 
continuing economic chaos in Europe could lead to Soviet control of Europe. See 18 EN-
CYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 365 (1995). 
127 One textbook on black politics conveyed that "Abraham Lincoln is the paradig-
matic president, setting an example ... for the handful of other American presidents who 
have dealt in a positive way with the African American freedom quest. " HANES WALTON, JR. 
& ROBERT C. SMI'IH, AMERICAN POUTICS AND 'IHE AMERICAN QuEST FOR UNIVERSAL 
FREEDOM 194 (2000). 
128 Id. (citing Abraham Lincoln's letter to Horace Greeley (Aug. 22, 1862». Precisely 
because of the strain of small idealism in U.S. foreign policy, Mrican Americans, in their 
struggle for equality, have historically looked beyond the boundaries of the United States. 
At the time of his death, Malcolm X (1925-65) was attempting to develop support among 
Mrican and other Third World countries for a United Nations' resolution condemning the 
United States for violating the human rights of its Mrican-American citizens. Id. at 292. 
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troleum,129 America recognizes Nigeria's worth as the largest oil pro-
ducer in Africa and the fifth largest in the OPEC.I30 Since 1974, Nige-
ria has been one of the largest exporters of crude oil to the United 
States. l3l Securing the United States' supply of Nigerian oil was one of 
the bases for then-Vice President George Bush's visit to Nigeria in 
1982.132 American companies such as Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron 
have substantial investments in the lucrative Nigerian oil industry, 
which, along with other Western oil companies, they dominate.1M 
Another of the United States' interests in Nigeria is to maintain 
ties (and with these, influence) to the nation once described as "the 
most African country" in the world. l34 Nigeria is rich in both human 
and natural resources, despite the fact that these are, as indicated ear-
lier, poorly managed.135 The country also plays a leadership role in 
Mrica, particularly in West Africa, that advances other U.S. interests. 
Under General Abacha, Nigeria led a peacekeeping mission as part of 
the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) that helped to stabilize long-time U.S. allies Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. Paradoxically, Nigeria was able, through ECOMOG, to 
install democracy in Liberia and to reinstate it in Sierra Leone while 
leaving its own citizens under the darkness of military rule. l36 Some 
scholars have described this mission as a ploy by the Abacha regime to 
enhance its "prestige at home and abroad."137 Nonetheless, this "ex-
traordinary investment" in regional stability138 arguably contributed to 
129 Since the 1970s, there has been a sense of urgency in the u.s. concerning Western 
access to world resources, particularly oil. Nigeria continued to ship oil to the United 
States during the 1973-74 OPEC oil crisis. In 1975, fearing that the country might join a 
second oil boycott, entirely cutting off supplies to the U.S. and the West, then-Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger proposed his first-ever state visit to Nigeria, but was rebuffed by the 
military government then headed by General Murtala Muhammed. See Elizabth Liagin, 
Obasanjo's U.S. Connections, THENEWS (Lagos),Apr.19, 1999, at 16. 
130 INTER-CHURCH COALITION OF AFRICA, ICCAF HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: THE SITUA-
TION IN NIGERIA IN 1999/2000 13 (Feb. 2000). 
131 TOYIN FALOLA ET AL., THE MIUTARY FACTOR IN NIGERIA, 1966-1985, at 167-68 
(1994). 
132 OSAGHAE, supra note 20, at 162. 
m SeeFALOLA ET AL., supra note 131, at 167; FRYNAS, supra note 12, at 8-58. 
134 The Most African Country: Nigerian Survey, ECONOMIsT,Jan. 23, 1982, at 3. 
135 See, e.g., ACHEBE, supra note 73, at 1-3. 
136 See Paul Omach, The African Crisis Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence 
of National Interests, 99 AFR. AFF. 73, 84 (2000). 
157 ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 109. 
us Provision of regional security in West Mrica has, over the last decade, cost Nigeria 
$10 billion and the lives of hundreds of Nigerian soldiers. See Leonard H. Robinson Jr., 
Clinton Visit Raises Hopes for Nigeria, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 27, 2000, at 43A; Clinton, supra 
2002] Dividend of Democracy 249 
the American goal of making the world safe for democracy. As former 
U.S. Secretary of State Albright noted, Nigeria is "potentially a very 
valuable partner for us in promoting peace, democracy, and the rule 
of law throughout West Africa. "1119 
A third U.S. interest is the maintenance of American cultural-
historical linkages to the country of Nigeria. A great number of 
Americans trace their roots to Africa.140 Many of those Americans, in-
cluding entertainer-scholar Paul B. Robeson (1898-1976), trace those 
origins to Nigeria.141 
Last, but certainly not least, America needs Nigeria's help in its 
campaign against international drug trafficking. The economic hard-
ships in Nigeria, beginning in the 1980s, resulted in the emergence of 
a significant drug-dependent culture142 and in the conversion of Ni-
gerian borders into a major route for the trafficking of cocaine and 
heroin into the United States. In its 1997 report on international drug 
trafficking, the State Department noted that "'Nigeria is the hub of 
African narcotics trafficking, and Nigerian poly-crime organizations 
continue to expand their role in narcotics trafficking worldwide. "'1411 
American agencies look to Nigerian political and law enforcement 
authorities in helping to ameliorate the nation's drug problem.144 Ni-
gerian-U.S. cooperation on drug trafficking dates back to 1987 when 
note 48. As Leonard Robinson Jr., a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Mrican 
Affairs, observed: 
Nigeria has spent more on international peacekeeping operations than the 
United States, Britain, France or any of the other Western industrial powers. 
When Western European powers were debating whether to send troops to 
end the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, Nigerian peacekeepers were at work 
in west Africa. 
Robinson, supra. 
159 Akande, supra note 117. 
140 As Secretary Rogers said in his 1970 Mrican policy statement, "one of every ten 
Americans" originated from Mrica. U.S. and Aftica in the '70s, supra note 1, at 480. 
141 JOHN MCCORMICK, COMPARATIVE POUTICS IN TRANSITION 386 (3d ed. 2001). 
142 See, e.g., Axel Klein, Trapped in the Traffick: Gruwing Problems of Drug Consumption in 
Lagos, 32]. MOD. AFR. STUD. 657, 659 (1994); see almABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 
236 (indicating that as of 1991, about "2,000 Nigerians [were] in prison around the world 
for drug trafficking"). In 1990, Nigeria created the National Drug Law Enforcement 
Agency ·'to eliminate the growing, processing, manufacturing, selling, exporting, and 
trafficking of hard drugs.'" Id. 
145 ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 237. About thirty percent of the heroin in-
tercepted at U.S. ports in 1999 is alleged to have been seized from "Nigerian-<:ontrolled 
carriers." Laolu Akande, Verdict Day fur Nigeria on Capitol Hil~ GUARDIAN ONUNE (Lagos), 
Aug. 11, 1999 (on file with author). 
144 See infra Part II1.B. 
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the two countries signed a mutual law enforcement agreement fol-
lowed by a special anti-drug Memorandum of Understanding. l45 The 
United States also looks to Nigeria to help reduce the number of 
Americans victimized by the offer of Nigerian business opportunities 
that are "too good to be true. "146 According to one estimate, "Ameri-
cans lose $2 billion annually to white [collar] crime syndicates based 
in Nigeria."147 
D. Nigeria's Interest in Relations with the United States 
Although this Article focuses on U.S. policy toward Nigeria, it is 
also important to discuss Nigeria's interests given that we are dealing 
with bilateral relations. 
1. Primary National Interests 
First, Nigeria sees in the United States a steady buyer of its oil. 
Although Nigeria'S share of the U.S. market has fluctuated over the 
years, the United States remains a primary purchaser of Nigerian 
crude oil. Second, Nigeria values political ties with America. The 
United States is one of the most powerful countries in the world, and 
the two countries share similar demographic features such as ethnic, 
economic, and religious complexities.148 Nigeria relies on these politi-
cal connections as it experiments with a presidential style of govern-
ment. Third, like many developing countries, Nigeria seeks to tap into 
American "technological capabilities"149 for its manpower develop-
ment needs. Tens of thousands of Nigerians have flocked to the 
United States in search of higher education, particularly during the 
1970s and 1980s. Recently, the number of Nigerians seeking U.S. edu-
cations has decreased dramatically, due to a mixture of economic 
difficulties and shortsighted governmental pOlicy.150 
145 ABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 236. 
146 These "advance fee scams" are designated "419"s in accordance with the section of 
the Nigerian criminal code that targets the offense. 
147 Akande, supra note 117. 
148 See Clinton, supra note 48. "America has people from over 200 racial, ethnic and re-
ligious groups. We have school districts in America where, in one school district, the par-
ents of the children speak over 100 different languages." [d. 
149 U.S. and Africa in the '70s, supra note 1, at 481. 
150 See Philip C. Aka, Education, Economic DlJUeiopment, and Return to Democratic Politics in 
Nigeria, 18]. THIRD WORLD STUD. 21, 24 (2001). 
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2. Complications Relating to Internal Tension 
Naturally, a nation's needs fluctuate along with changes to its in-
ternal social and intellectual landscape. For instance, despite the 
United States' interest in the economic and political health of Nige-
ria, the nation occasionally appears more greatly motivated by a con-
cern for Nigerian wildlife than for the welfare of its people.J51 The 
structure of Nigerian interests has been affected both by the emigra-
tion of its intellectual manpower and by the violent ethnic conflict of 
recent years. 
Ironically, it is the United States that now benefits from the de-
velopment in Nigerian manpower, rather than vice versa. Many Nige-
rians who come to America for education continue to reside in the 
country rather than return to unfavorable political and economic 
conditions in their home country.152 These emigre Nigerian-
Americans include Philip Emeagwali, the "Bill Gates of Mrica, " whose 
mathematical genius President Clinton praised during his address to a 
joint assembly of the Nigerian National Assembly on August 26, 
2000}53 Immigration policies such as the visa lotteryI54 compound this 
"brain drain" since many of the Nigerians who win these lotteries are 
educated individuals whose talents the country needs. I55 A more bal-
anced relationship between the United States and Nigeria would help 
stabilize this situation. As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
151 Consider the following story recounted by Professor Mbaku in which Western aca-
demics attending a conference on Mrica spent an inordinate amount of time analyzing the 
protection of East Mrican wildlife. John Mukum Mbaku, Panel on Western Countries and 
Democratization in Africa, supra note 80. Mter the conference, Dr. Mbaku told me about a 
well-known American environ men tal group that offered to buy hundreds of acres of arable 
land in the Riverine area of Nigeria with an intent to leave the land idle in order to pre-
serve snails and sea life. This group obviously had more concern for this sea life threat-
ened with extinction than for the Nigerians who will have to make do without this land in 
a portion of the country that is already faced with high population pressure. 
152 See, e.g., Aka, supra note 150, at 29-30; Bennett A. Odunsi, An Analysis of Brain-Drain 
and Its Impact on Manpower Devewpment in Nigeria, 13 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 193, 193 
(1996). 
15~ Clinton, supra note 48. The term Nigerian-American is borrowed from President 
Clinton who used it in his speech. 
154 The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) uses this program to in-
crease the migration into the United States of people from certain countries or parts of 
the world the INS determines to be under-represented on migration into the U.S. 
155 April Gordon, The New Diaspora-African Immigration to the United States, 15 J. THIRD 
WORLD STUD. 79,88 (1998); see al50PETER STALKER, WITHOUT FRONTIERS: THE IMPACT OF 
GLOBAUZATION ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 79, 107-08 (2000) (presenting a more 
broad-based analysis of the problem). The INS imposes a minimum of high school educa-
tion for immigrants coming to the United States under the visa lottery program. 
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for Mrican Mfairs Leonard H. Robinson Jr. noted on the eve of Presi-
dent Clinton's 2000 visit to Nigeria, "one of the most important things 
the United States can do is to help the Obasanjo government reverse 
the trend that has sent the best and brightest Nigerians fleeing to the 
U.S. and elsewhere."156 
Nigeria may also need creative external help in containing the 
rash of deadly religious-ethnic conflicts that have rocked the country 
under General Obasanjo.l57 In a survey released just before President 
Clinton's visit in 2000, Professor Wole Soyinka portended that Clinton 
"may prove to be the last serving U.S. President to have visited a na-
tion called Nigeria."158 Impelling this prediction was the fact that one 
northern state after another was declaring its adoption of Islamic 
Sharia law over its former secular system of government.159 Not with-
out reason, Professor Soyinka regards these declarations as effective 
acts of secession from the country.l60 Recent upheavals in the country 
reinforce this thinking.161 
Although the pressing nature of these national concerns may 
seem fairly straightforward, Nigeria's pursuit of international assis-
tance is complicated by the fact that Nigeria's leaders must be the 
ones to request it. There is little evidence that the Obasanjo govern-
ment is seeking American help in combating its "brain drain" prob-
lem.162 With respect to ethnic-religious conflicts, General Obasanjo's 
response has been to either minimize the magnitude of the prob-
leml63 or to react temperamentally to any suggestion by Westerners 
156 Robinson, supra note 138. 
157 Ibelema, supra note 39, at 211-14; Chiahemen, supra note 57; Chukwudi Nwabuko 
& Sunday Aghaeze, How Tiv Villages Were Sacked, THISDAY, Oct. 26, 2001, available at 
http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2001/1O/26/20011026newsOl.html. Onishi, supra 
note 72; Tr(JUbled Times in Nigeria, supra note 60. 
156 Wole Soyinka, The Last Presidential Visitor?, NIGERIAWORLD, Aug. 25, 2000. 
159 ld.; see also Chukwudi Abiandu et al., S(JUthern Leaders Meet, Reject Sharia, GUARDIAN 
ONLINE (Lagos) ,July 11, 2000 (on file with author). 
160 Soyinka, supra note 158; see also Laolu Akande, Suyinka Faults Sharia, Brings Home 
Radio Kudirat, GUARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), Nov. 3, 1999 (on file with author) (describing 
the adoption of Sharia as legal code in Zamfara state as "a tacit act of secession from the 
nation"). 
161 See, e.g., Tr(JUbled Times in Nigeria, supra note 60. 
162 Compare Nigeria's failure to seek help here, for example, to a country like South 
Africa which is fighting to stem the tide of its medical doctors leaving for Canada. See Ra-
chel L. Swarns, West Lures Its Doctors; S(JUth Africa Fights Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at 5. 
163 See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62. When asked by two U.S. reporters how a person 
like the General can "manage a nation in which a chunk of it seems to be governed by a 
different set of laws," he replied unconvincingly that "political Shar'ia is new and [itl will 
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that Nigerian democracy is wobbling from the stress of these 
conflicts. l64 Positing that national unity is not a negotiable proposi-
tion, he has ruled out the possibility of any sort of national confer-
ence of ethnic groups to resolve some of the conflicts before they ex-
pand. l65 While one understands Obasanjo's fear that convening a 
national conference might spell the disintegration of the country, it 
demonstrates the extraordinary fragility of the country if the simple 
attempt to convene a meeting threatens its stability. Nigeria needs a 
leader who "does not assume anything automatic about Nigeria's 
'unity,'" but rather is ''willing to engage in a far-reaching fundamental 
reform of the state. ,,166 
Some writers have advocated for reorientation of Nigerian for-
eign policy to meet the internal needs of the country. Analyst Reuben 
Abati urges that the country pursue a "common man's foreign pol-
icy, "167 "defined in terms of the interests of the common man. "168 
Such a policy would "enhance[] national pride" without "wast[ing] 
our scarce resources .... "169 Abati wants Nigeria to "shed [the] father 
Christmas" image in its relations with the rest of Mrica,l7o Nigerian 
foreign policy, he said, must be defined "in terms of [the nation's 
own] gains and interests;"l71 the country "must gain strength not 
weakness, from [its] relationship with outsiders. "172 
3. Finding Common Ground 
Nigeria will maximize the benefit of its relationship with the 
United States by identifying and exploiting the points at which the 
come and go, because if you want to use Shar'ia to achieve political ends it will not hold 
.... [U]nless you use what is right, whatever else you use doesn't last." Id. 
164 See General Obasanjo's response, Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62, to a U.S. re-
porter's suggestion that Nigerian democracy is continuing "to struggle to get off the 
ground." Obasanjo replied, inter alia, that "it's a new one on me that Nigerian democracy 
is struggling to get off the ground .... I am learning that from you .... " Id. 
165 Madu Onuora & Saxone Akhaine, Obasanjo Rules Out Sovereign National Conference, 
GUARDIAN ONUNE (Lagos) ,July 8, 2001 (on file with author). 
166 Tayo Oke, Why Obasanjo Must Succeed: Why He Cannot, THENEWS (Lagos), Feb. 7, 
2000, at 49; see also Bol:yi Akinyemi, Nigeria: A Mere Geographical Expression?, THE GUARDIAN 
(Lagos), July 6, 2001, at 8-9; Peter Ekeh, Breakdown in Nigeria's National Consensus, THE 
GUARDIAN (Lagos) ,July 2,2001. Both articles argue that the country must adopt genuine 
or true federalism if it is to avert disintegration. 
167 Abati, supra note 65. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170Id. 
171Id. 
172 Abati, supra note 65. 
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two nations' interests overlap. Nigerian and U.S. interests converge 
with respect to the purchase and sale of crude oil and the necessity of 
maintaining cordial political relations. Concerning the first, U.S. con-
sumers need Nigerian oil, and Nigeria sees a strong and steady part-
ner in the market for its export. On the second point, U.s. policy-
makers see the need to maintain a diplomatic foothold in one of the 
most important and influential African countries. For its part, Nigeria 
needs strong and stable ties with the United States to improve its im-
age in the international community. Although these ties may also pro-
vide vital assistance in Nigeria's pursuit of the material "democracy 
dividend, "173 even if no substantive help results, the Nigerian govern-
ment can still flaunt the mere existence of cordial relations with "the 
leading nation of the world today .... ,,174 
This appearance of accord and mutual benefit will always be 
questioned, however, by those political analysts who see U.S.-Nigerian 
relations as imbalanced and imperialistic. They contrast Nigeria's 
chummy relationship with the West against its more African-centered 
policies from 1975 to 1983, including those during Obasanjo's first 
regime between 1976 and 1979.175 These critics lament the "near-
disappearance of anti-imperialism from the politics of the Nigerian 
state and the civil society," maintaining ruefully, "our country is now 
the chief client of the global dictatorship. ,,176 
III. CHARACTERIZING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
When General Obasanjo came into office in May 1999, the 
United States government sent a delegation to his inauguration. A few 
months later, President Clinton undertook a visit to Africa that was 
praised as "the first cabinet-level meeting between American and Afri-
can representatives from around the continent,"l77 including Nige-
173 See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62; Robin Wright, Olusegun Obasanjo: Nigerian Survi-
vor, LA. TIMEs,June 3, 2001, at M3. General Obasanjo granted both of these interviews to 
U.S. and Western journalists. 
174 These are General Obasanjo's own words from a Spring 2001 interview. See Cobb & 
Kramer, supra note 62. 
175 SeeABORISADE & MUNDT, supra note 6, at 250-51; FALOLA ETAL., supra note 131, at 
166; OSAGHAE, supra note 20, at 104-09; Stephen Wright & Julius Emeka Okolo, Nigeria: 
Aspirations of&gionalPuwer, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POUCIES, supra note 74, at 118-19. 
176 Edwin Madunagu, Disappearance of Anti-Imperialism, THE GUARDIAN (Lagos), Aug. 9, 
2001, at 63. 
177 Minter, supra note 47, at 200. 
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ria.178 The Clinton-era policy toward Mrica was marked by his active 
engagement and included the following: the unveiling of new initia-
tives on debt; support for the fight against HIV / AIDS by significant 
financial donation and by re-classifying the epidemic as a security is-
sue; passage of the Mrica Growth and Opportunity Act opening 
American markets to more of the continent's manufactured goods;179 
and the creation of a high-profile "month of Mrica" at the UN Secu-
rity CounciJ.l8o Clinton believed Nigeria must clean up domestic acts 
of corruption and other governmental imperfections to realize its po-
tential as "a pivot point on which all Africa's future turns. "181 Mter 
Clinton left office, the mantle for U.S. policy towards Nigeria and M-
rica fell on his successor, President George W. Bush. This Article will 
make a few preliminary statements, illustrated through Table 2, be-
fore proceeding to closely examine each form of American foreign 
policy enumerated in the profile. 
Table 2 
P fil fAm ro eo encan S £, N' upport or Igenan D emocratlZation 
Category Illustrative Activity Assessment 
1P0litical xchange of visits, including presidential iExpanded/Growing 
trips; lifting of restrictions on visits to 
Nigeria by American officials and to the 
U.S. by Nigerian government officials; 
ifting of ban on flights to Lagos airport; 
electoral support; certification of Nigeria 
asdru~free 
~ilitary military training; arms supply; U.S.-Nigeria iExpanded/ Growing 
defense cooperation agreements 
IEconomic AIDS support; debt rescheduling help; IAbout the same as under 
lectoral support; birth control and family Clinton administration or 
!planning declining 
In Table 2, the activities under each category heading are illustra-
tive rather than exhaustive. Political relations is a broad category that 
178 See Greg Myre, Clinton Asks Nigeria to ClRan up its Act, CHI. SUN-nMES, Aug. 27, 2000, 
at 36A; Nakashima, supra note 60; Robinson, supra note 138; Clinton, supra note 48. 
179 The Act gives qualified Mrican countries preferential access to U.S. markets for 
about 4000 goods. Nosa Igiebor et al., Nigerians Must Be Patient, TELL (Lagos), June 25, 
2001, at 82,85 (comprising an interview with Howard F. Jeter, U.S. Ambassador to Nige-
ria). Sponsors of the bill sold it as marking the "paradigm shift" from aid to trade in U.S. 
policy toward Mrica. Minter, supra note 47, at 202. 
180 Minter, supra note 47, at 200-01; Milan Vesely, After the Clinton SmilR, Will It Be the 
Bush Snarl?, US-AFRICA ONLINE, Feb. 2001 (on file with author). 
181 Myre, supra note 178. 
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includes diplomatic and cultural-historical activities. Some activities, 
such as electoral support, appear in two separate categories. Other 
activities that have been classified in only one category could actually 
illustrate others, as well. For example, birth control and family plan-
ning are included under the "economic" category but are also sensi-
tive issues that could be classified as political. Given the dependent 
nature of U.S.-Nigerian relations/82 there are some who will regard 
American purchase of Nigerian crude oil as U.S. economic "assis-
tance" to Nigeria. This study does not take that view; rather, it regards 
those ties as a bilateral trade relationship.183 On a final note, there are 
also some forms of United States assistance that are not easily catego-
rized. For example, between October 1998 and September 1999, Ni-
geria was said to have received assistance from the U.S. amounting to 
$27.5 million that is uncategorized.184 
Given this Article's assessment that U.S. support has expanded in 
the political and military realms, and is declining only in the eco-
nomic realm, a reader might conclude that American support for Ni-
gerian democracy is sufficient. However, such an interpretation is in-
correct, as a closer analytical perspective will demonstrate. 
A. Political-Diplomatic Relations 
Political-diplomatic initiatives are low cost and can greatly 
influence the success or failure of Nigerian democratization. For in-
stance, what did it cost to remove the U.S. order suspending direct 
flights to Lagos, Nigeria which was allegedly imposed due to ineffec-
tive security?185 America routinely forges and severs diplomatic ties 
182 BASSEYE E. ATE, DECOLONIZATION AND DEPENDENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NIGE-
RIAN-U.S. RELATIONS 1960-1984, at 2 (1987). 
183 See Cobb & Kramer, supra note 62, in which General Obasanjo argues that Nigeria's 
sale of oil to America is "trad[e]" and not "help." Id. He noted that he found the word help 
"a little bit unpalatable." Id. But Obasanjo did not consider the term unpalatable in an 
interview two weeks later with the Los Angeles Times. When asked what the United States 
could do to help Nigerian democratization, he responded in pertinent part, "We adopted 
democracy not just for the intrinsic value of democracy, but because our people believe 
that democracy can enhance their quality of life . . . . They expect, rightly, a democracy 
dividend. If that doesn't come, they will feel disenchanted. The United States can help us with 
that." Wright, supra note 173, at M3 (emphasis added). 
184 Akande, supra note 117. 
185 One state department justification for the ban on direct flights to Lagos was a con-
cern about "extortion by law enforcement and immigration officials." Robert D. Kaplan, 
The Coming Anarchy, in GLOBAUZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A NEW CENTURY, supra 
note 7, at 34, 35. As Kaplan points out, "[t]his is one of the few times that the U.S. gov-
ernment has embargoed a foreign airport for reasons that are linked p\ll"ely to crime." Id. 
2002] Dividend of Democracy 257 
with nations, even where no U.S. interest is at stake. With respect to 
Nigeria, the United States maintained political ties even in the face of 
atrocities perpetrated by the prior Babangida and Abacha govern-
ments; it merely cut back contact with the leaders themselves. Now, 
with the inauguration of the Obasanjo government, Nigeria has suc-
ceeded in casting off its "bad boy" image, leaving the United States 
ample room to encourage development through diplomatic initiatives 
created with General Obasanjo's cooperation. Such initiatives could 
be invaluable to the United States as well, securing Nigerian coopera-
tion in the war against international drug traffickingI86 and perhaps 
even minimizing Nigerian business scams targeted at Americans. 
Through increased political-diplomatic relationships, the United 
States can advance many of the other shared national interests. As 
William Minter explained: 
[T] he stated goals in Washington and those of African de-
mocracy advocates are much more compatible today than 
during the cold war period. A considerable degree of over-
lap can be found in statements of desirable objectives, 
whether they come from United States policymakers, inter-
national conferences, or pro-democracy groups in African 
countries. I87 
These shared interests include a commitment to democracy, human 
rights, the rule of law, citizen participation, a free press, and increased 
governmental accountability and transparency. 188 
B. Military Relations 
Like political-diplomatic initiatives, creating lllitiatives that ad-
dress military relations can also be very cost effective, considering the 
potential payback in political influence. As is the case with political 
relations, Nigeria's improved political status also smoothes the way to 
creating military-focused initiatives. Two initiatives at the heart of U.S. 
military relations with Africa and Nigeria alike are the Africa Crisis 
Response Initiative (ACRI) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies 
186 See Akande, supra note 117 (quoting testimony of Ambassador Howard Jeter, then 
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, who connected "increased assistance to Nigeria" 
with "'cooperation in countering narcotics'" and declaring that America will not "provide 
direct assistance to any government not meeting the standards for either certification or a 
waiver"). Mr. Jeter is now U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria. 
187 Minter, supra note 47, at 205. 
188 [d. at 204. 
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(ACSS) under the Defense Department,189 The ACRI provides short-
term military training for battalions from selected African countries 
to participate in peacekeeping missions. 190 The ACSS is designed to 
train executive-level military officers and civilian counterparts,191 The 
Center's mission statement stipulates that it will "encourage an appre-
ciation of appropriate civil-military relationships and an understand-
ing of effective defense resource management across Mrican govern-
ments. "192 The ACSS' curriculum stresses democratic civil-military 
relations, national security-oriented decision making, and manage-
ment too1S.193 
These initiatives, however, can also create tensions in the donee 
country, such as those that have surfaced in Nigeria. Some civilian 
Nigerians are fearful of U.S. military presence in their country, and 
more than a few Nigerian military officers question the United States' 
motivation to seek expanded military ties. For example, former Nige-
rian Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Victor Malu considered 
American military presence overbearing, protesting that "[y]our best 
foreign friend today can be your worst enemy tomorrow. "194 He ob-
jected to the United States' request for Nigeria's military contingency 
plan, which is "supposed to be our secret. ,,195 Many attribute General 
Obasanjo's replacement of Malu as Chief of Army Staff to Malu's stri-
dent and open opposition to increased military cooperation with the 
United States,196 Nigerian military officers-especially those of Gen-
eral Malu's generation-are more comfortable receiving military assis-
tance from Britain, the country's former colonial overlord, than from 
the United States. Such strong opposition to U.S. involvement has 
been seen as a stumbling block in Obasanjo's attempt to consolidate 
189 Id. at 209. 
190 Id. 
191Id. 
192 Minter, supra note 47, at 209. 
193Id. 
194 Kingsley Omonobi, General Malu Challenges American Secret Interest, THE GUARDIAN 
(Lagos) ,Jan. 26, 2001 (on file with author). 
195 Id. The military's contingency plan is a restricted secret document containing 
classified information on the army, such as its strength and tactical operations, among 
other details. UchegbuAchilleus, The Ultimate Price, THE SOURCE, May 7,2001, at 10,11. 
196 See Uchegbu Achilleus, Things Have Not Gone Well, THE SOURCE, May 7, 2001, at 12-
13; Kayode Fayemi, Dilemma of Civilian Control (1), THENEWS (Lagos), May 14, 2001, at 56-
57; Kayode Fayemi, Dilemma of Civilian Control (2), THENEWS (Lagos), May 28,2001, at 52-
53; Kayode Fayemi, MaluDeserves Commendation, TELL (Lagos),June 18, 2001, at 72-75. 
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the Nigerian government and to subject the coup-prone military to 
civilian control and oversight.197 
Another major complication with this form of initiative is the po-
tential for U.S. training program operatives to interfere in preexisting 
cultural disputes, building "unexamined links" between the U.S. mili-
tary and the armies of the countries they seek to assist.198 There is no 
evidence that these training programs promote the values of democ-
racy among the foreign trainees for whom they were designed.I99 
Trainees who graduated from U.S. programs in Latin America and 
Indonesia have been implicated in widespread human rights 
abuses.2OO Although the ACSS professes to guard against these 
abuses,201 the peacekeeping capacity of these programs is still un-
tested and unproven.202 Manuals for some of these training programs 
claim that the programs will "organize, train, advise, and assist" the 
affected foreign military so that it can "free and protect its society 
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. "203 But, as one percep-
tive analyst points out, these functions are more appropriately the re-
sponsibility of a nation's police force, rather than its military.204 A fi-
nal concern is the problem of militarization. In the Caribbean during 
the 1980s, expansion of U.S. military assistance under President 
Reagan served primarily to heighten the U.S. military profile, milita-
rizing a region that had formerly been regarded as a "zone of peace" 
at the expense of more pressing problems.205 As Paul Sutton ex-
plained with reference to the Caribbean: 
The distinction between the military and the police func-
tions that holds in the United States became blurred in the 
Caribbean, as the Department of Defense, the FBI, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, the CIA, and a host of other U.S. 
197 See gmerallyJoseph, supra note 58, at 48-50; Mohammed Haruna, Beheading the Mon-
ster, TElL (Lagos) ,June 28, 1999, at 48-49; and Fayemi's articles on the dilemma of civilian 
control, supra note 196. 
198 Minter, supra note 47, at 209. According to Minter, unexamined links arise from 
military training programs when those programs "send signals of partisan support or ap-
proval for military forces involved in conflict or human rights abuses." Id. 
199 Id. at 209-10 
200 Id. at 210. 
2Q1 Id. at 209. 
2Q2 Minter, supra note 47, at 210. 
203Id. 
204Id. 
2Q5 See Sutton, supra note 118, at 283-87. 
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agencies sought to meet the threats from drug trafficking, 
money laundering .... Borders also were breaking down. 206 
C. Economic Relations 
Although economic initiatives appear to be the form of support 
most needed in Nigerian democratization efforts, the United States 
sponsors fewer economic initiatives than any other kind of initiative. 
During the 1998-99 fiscal year, the United States provided only $27.5 
million in aid to Nigeria.207 Although President Clinton brought a $20 
million aid package to help in Nigeria'S fight against HIV / AIDS, 208 
the United States has not been receptive to the Obasanjo govern-
ment's repeated appeals for the forgiveness of Nigeria's $37 billion 
foreign debt. President Clinton was only willing to allow for debt re-
scheduling209 in spite of his August 2000 statement to the Nigerian Na-
tional Assembly that "Nigeria shouldn't have to choose between pay-
ing interest on debt and meeting basic human needs, especially in 
education and health. "210 
One scholar noted that democratization assistance to sub-
Saharan Mrica for the decade as a whole represented just under six 
percent of total U.S. nonmilitary development assistance.211 Of the 
resources set aside for democratization in Africa by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1996, only ten 
percent went to West Africa.212 
206 Id. at 290. 
207 Akande, supra note 117. 
208 Nakashima, supra note 60. This package supplemented a $60 million investment in 
vaccine research and new support for AIDS treatment and prevention. On the magnitude 
of the HIV / AIDS epidemic in Africa, see Robert Barr, United Nations Projects Annual Increase 
of6Million AIDS Cases Worldwide, PINE BLUFF COM. (Ark.), Nov. 25, 1998, at 3B; Michael D. 
Lemonick, Little Hope, Less Help, TIME, July 24,2000, at 38 (each article indicates that about 
70% of the world's population infected with HIV / AIDS is in Africa). On the growing scale 
of the disease in Nigeria, see, for example, Mbakeren P. Dimah & Agher Dimah, The Poten-
tial Impact of HIV/ AIDS on Agrarian Societies: The Case of Tiv of Central Nigeria, in SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 97 (Valentine U. James ed., 
1999); Guest, supra note 50, at 13-14. The epidemic received continent-level attention at a 
summit meeting of African leaders held in Abuja on April 27, 2001, at the close of which 
the leaders adopted the Abuja Declaration on HIV / AIDS & Related Diseases. See D'Arcy 
Doran, African Leaders Declare AIDS Emergency, Reuters, Apr. 27, 2001. 
209 Clinton, supra note 48 (stating that America is "prepared to support a substantial 
reduction of Nigeria's debts on a multilateral basis .... "). 
210Id. 
2ll Harbeson, supra note 91, at 250-51. 
212 Id. at 252. 
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Diamond insists that this situation is changing, given the shift 
from self-interested Cold War politics to a more idealistic notion of 
democracy for its own sake.213 He discusses a multiplicity of U.S. assis-
tance programs, pointing to organizations such as the National En-
dowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID and their efforts to pro-
mote democracy in Africa.214 He proclaims that U. S. economic 
investments in Mrican democracy are ''without precedent, "215 describ-
ing America's contribution to Mrican democratization as "substantial 
and growing. "216 
There are a number of problems with this optimistic assessment, 
however. At the outset, it is important to note that Diamond's article 
was written in 1995 and thus fails to account for developments-or the 
lack thereof-in recent years. Secondly, many of the initiatives he dis-
cusses are programs for Mrica as a whole and are not specifically tar-
geted at Nigeria. Thirdly, most of these programs are small, often 
poorly coordinated initiatives that did not rise to the level of substan-
tial economic assistance. 
In sum, American economic assistance for Nigerian democratiza-
tion has been modest rather than substantia1.217 Despite the fact that, 
as Diamond points out, the context of United States foreign policy has 
shifted, America has largely maintained its formerly low level of eco-
nomic assistance to Nigeria. The likelihood of a renewed idealistic 
commitment is also undermined by the fact that many U.S.-sponsored 
institutions were created during the Cold War to promote U.S. secu-
rity.218 America's lukewarm financial commitment to democratization 
in Nigeria goes a long way to explain the significant gap between 
rhetoric and reality in U.S. policy toward Mrica.219 
215 Diamond, supra note 1, at 252--62. These changes include the fact that America no 
longer needs to worry about countering the spread of Soviet military and political 
influence in Africa, or about the spread of hostile ideological and economic systems. Id. at 
253. 
214 See id. at 262--68 (identifying these programs). 
215 Id. at 264. 
216Id. at 267. 
217 See Nakashima, supra note 60 (outlining the comments of Professor Jean Herskovits 
of the State University of New York who assessed the aid package Clinton brought with him 
on his visit to Nigeria as "more symbolic than concrete"). 
218 For example, the National Endowment for Democracy was created during the Cold 
War days of the Reagan presidency as a vehicle to promote U.S. national security interests 
in the developing world, including the Caribbean and Latin America. Sutton, supra note 
118, at 282-83. 
219 See Minter, supra note 47, at 200-01,204. America's tight-fisted nature in the area of 
economic assistance rings eerily similar to the nature of the Soviet Union with respect to 
some of Africa's socialist-oriented countries during the the Cold War era. SeeJohn R. Heil-
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D. Summation 
During his run for the White House, President George W. Bush 
expressed little interest in foreign affairs,22o especially as they relate to 
Mrica.221 The new president fears over-extending American resources 
in favor of a "more humble foreign policy" that is well-attuned to 
America's "national interests. "222 Equally significant, his administra-
tion includes individuals like General Colin Powell who view involve-
ment with Mrica as unrewarding "social work."223 Despite these disin-
clinations, Bush's initiatives in Africa have turned out better than 
expected. He has pledged his government's support for the fight 
against HIV / AIDS in Mrica224 and the United States is part of a G-8 
projected development plan for Africa.225 Although Table 2 shows 
U.S. economic initiatives to be "about the same as under Clinton or 
declining," political-diplomatic initiatives are indicated as "ex-
brunn, The Flea on Nigeria's Back: The Foreign Policy of Benin, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POllCIES, 
supra note 74, at 43,48 (discussing the "stingy nature of Soviet aid," citing Colin W. Law-
son, Soviet Economic Aid to Africa, 87 AFR. AFF. 509 (1988». "Among developed countries," 
as William Minter points out, "the United States provides the smallest percentage of its 
central government budget for development assistance (0.81 percent in 1996) and the 
smallest as a percentage of GNP (0.08 percent)." Minter, supra note 47, at 203 n.I. 
22Q David E. Sanger, Entanglements: A New View of Where America Fits in the World, N.Y 
TIMES, Feb. 18,2001, at AI. 
221 One analyst wrote that Bush "thinks Nigeria is a continent and couldn't care less if 
it isn't." Vesely, supra note 180. 
222 Sanger, supra note 220. 
223 General Powell called Somalia "a place we can't make a country of," and he advised 
President Clinton that "we've got to find a way to get out, and soon." Vesely, supra note 180 
(quoting Powell's autobiography, COllN POWELL with JOSEPH E. PERISCO, My AMERICAN 
JOURNEY (1996». According to Milan Vesely, both Powell and his fellow African American 
Condoleeza Rice, Bush's National Secmity Adviser, "view the world through the prism of 
big power politics rather than through affinity with their roots." Vesely, supra note 180. To 
them, "Africa is well down due to its scant military or trading importance." Id. The phrase 
"social work" was actually coined by Michael Mandelbaum, Clinton's foreign adviser dur-
ing his 1992 presidential campaign. See David F. Gordon, Africa Today, in GREAT DECISIONS: 
SPECIAL ISSUE 59 (1998). 
224 See Doran, supra note 208. According to this report, President Bush's proposed 
budget for the next fiscal year includes $2.5 billion for HIV / AIDS; $480 million of the 
amount is earmarked for international HIV / AIDS assistance. Id. At an April 2001 African 
summit on AIDS, Nancy Powell, a U.S. State Department representative stated, "[slome of 
you have characterized HIV / AIDS as the number one threat to your nations and peoples. 
And you are right. We must do our part, but no amount of outside assistance alone can 
solve this. Ultimately the key to fight HIV / AIDS in Mrica will be Mrican." Id. 
225 See G-8 Rescue Plan for Africa, THE GUARDIAN (Lagos),July 30, 2001, at 18. This G-8 
plan will be devoted to stimulating "private investment, increasing intra-African trade, 
combating hunger and enhancing food security, democracy as well as the prevention and 
reduction of conflict." Id. Besides the United States, the G-8 countries include Britain, 
Canada, France,Japan, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Id. 
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panded/growing." So too are U.S. military initiatives.226 With respect 
to Nigeria, both Nigerian policymakers227 and their U.S. counter-
parts228 insist that ties between the two countries are developing nor-
mally under President Bush. 
IV. GLOBALIZATION AND U.S.-NIGERIA RELATIONS 
A. Defining Globalization 
The concept of globalization is difficult to describe, partly be-
cause the term is so loosely used and is applied to so many different 
processes.229 One use of the word involves global restructuring,230 
characterized by "widespread economic liberalization and tremen-
dous surges in international trade and investment. "231 Within the past 
two decades, processes within the international system have "pro-
duced a qualitatively different world economy. "232 These processes 
include the vastly increased integration of international markets 
through new patterns of trade, finance, production, flows of capital, 
and an increasingly dense web of treaties and international institu-
tions.233 This economic-based definition, however, is not sufficiently 
226 See, e.g., Omo Omoruyi, Nigrma/US. Difense Pact: In lWwse Interest?, TmSDAy,July 22, 
2001, at 18-19 (expressing concern regarding expanded U.S. military interests in the 
country). 
227 See Folabi Lawal, Dividends of Democracy Will Take Time, TlUSDAY, Aug. 7, 2001, at 11 
(interviewing Nigeria's Ambassador to the United States, Professor Jibril Aminu and, 
among other things, articulating a multiplicity of reasons why the Bush administration 
appears to be taking "more than a passing interest" in Nigerian and Mrican affairs). 
228 See Nosa Igiebor et al., supra note 179, at 86 (responding to the question whether 
President Bush will engage in Mrican affairs like Clinton did). 
229 STALKER, supra note 155, at 2. 
2!O James H. Mittelman, How Does Globalization Really Work?, in GLOBALIZATION: CRITI-
CAL REFLECTIONS 229,229 (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996); see also ROBERT O. KEOHANE & 
JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 228-29 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that global-
ization "expresses a ... widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is chang-
ing"). 
231 Dunoff, supra note 104, at 136. Globalization is a much-discussed subject; an entire 
industry of works on globalization has already surfaced. For a sampling of this rich litera-
ture, see generally the collection of essays in GLOBAUZATION AND THE CHALLENGES OF A 
NEW CENTURY, supra note 7; GLOBAUZATION, supra note 230; and KEOHANE & NYE, supra 
note 230, at 237-57. 
232 Dunoff, supra note 104, at 136. 
233 Id.,· see also CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE 
POUTICS OF STATE SURVIVAL 24 (1996) (embodying a more comprehensive list of changes, 
including a rapid increase in the mobility of capital; a resulting increase in levels of struc-
tural differentiation and functional integration in the global economy; a shift away from 
resources and toward human skills as the critical element in wealth creation; a startling 
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inclusive.234 As opposed to a mere economic event, globalization is a 
process that integrates economics, politics, culture, and ideology.235 In 
this way it is a "worldwide phenomenon" involving a "coalescence of 
varied transnational processes and domestic structures, allowing the 
economy, politics, culture, and ideology of one country to penetrate 
another. "236 In short, globalization refers "both to the compression of 
the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a 
whole."237 
It is important to note that globalization is not a completely new 
or recent phenomenon. Rather, it is the "intensification"238 of eco-
nomic, political, social, and cultural relations that were already at 
work;239 for instance, the movement of people across borders goes 
back to the very beginning of time.240 Building on this notion of an-
cient processes in a new world, writers such as Peter Stalker have ar-
gued that it is more realistic to view globalization "as the latest phase 
in a long historical process. "241 Stalker maintains that what is truly new 
about the phenomenon-and is therefore at its essence-is the fact that 
barriers between relatively independent entities like states, econo-
mies, and cultures are dissolving and, in the process, opening up the 
possibility of some kind of global consciousness.242 Nonetheless, even 
growth in information flows and the capacity to process information; the emergence of a 
global culture; and pressures on governments to manage their economies in accordance 
with a global search for comparative advantage, and by the impact of values derived from 
the global culture). 
234 See also Hans-Henrik Holm & Georg Sl'Irensen, Introduction: What Has Changed?, in 
WHOSE WORlD ORDER? UNEVEN GLOBALIZATION AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 7 (Hans-
Henrik Holm & Georg Sl'Irensen eds., 1995) (stating that globalization "entail[s] a move-
ment toward a single, unified global economy .... "). 
235 James H. Mittelman, The Dynamics of Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION, supra note 
230, at 1, 2. 
236 Id. at 3. 
237 ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 8 
(1992); see also Mazrui, supra note 7 (describing globalization as the "gradual villagization 
of the world"). 
238 Holm & Sl'Irensen, supra note 234, at 4. 
239 As far back as 1957, Karl Polanyi talked about a "double movement" consisting of 
the expansion of market forces and a reaction to those forces in the form of demands for 
self-protection against capital's socially disruptive and polarizing effects. KARL POLANYI, 
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 219 
(1957). 
240 For specific examples, some of which date back to the period of the Middle Ages in 
Europe, see STALKER, supra note 155, at 3. Professor Mazrui, supra note 7, most appropri-
ately describes globalization as involving "ancient processes in a new world." 
241 STALKER, supra note 155, at 10. 
242Id. at 8. 
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these changes have accompanied the end of the Cold War and must 
therefore be associated with the post-Cold War era. 243 
Although globalization involves processes that may be described 
as inter-national, it is not a process of internationalization244 such that 
an increasing number of events are taking place simultaneously in 
more than one country.245 Rather, globalization, in its strongest sense, 
goes beyond internationalization and implies a higher plane of or-
ganization-one at which discrete national entities are themselves dis-
solving so that all major political and economic decisions will ulti-
mately be transmitted globally. This new world may witness the death 
of geography246 and also, for one, the demise of the nation-state.247 A 
significant concern about this process is its tendency to constrain na-
tional options and erode the integrity of national boundaries.248 Pro-
fessor Mittelman elaborates that "[s]tatecraft, tested as it is by non-
state actors, is reduced in efficacy relative to transnational forces. "249 
He argues that "the drive to bring the state back to the forefront of 
social theory requires fresh analysis in light of globalization. "250 
B. Two Views on the Effects of Globalization on Africa 
In discussing the effects of globalization on Mrica, one can adopt 
either of two outlooks. The first paints a roundly negative picture of 
globalization's effects, characterizing the Third World as "the battle-
ground of globalization"251 and Mrica as "the Third World's Third 
243 CLAPHAM, supra note 233, at 24. But, scholars continue to disagree as to whether 
globalization is a new international system that has replaced the Cold War. For the debate, 
see Thomas L. Friedman (contending that it is) and Ignacio Ramonet (maintaining con-
tra), Dueling Gwbalizations, in WORLD POUTICS 10, 10-20 (Helen Purkitt ed., 21st ed. 2001-
01). One point on which they agree, however, is that modern globalization dominates 
international relations. 
244 CLAPHAM, supra note 234, at 2. 
245 Id. 
246 See generally RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF GE-
OGRAPHY (1992). 
247 STALKER, supra note 155, at 9. 
248 See id. at 8; Slaughter, supra note 116, at 118; see also ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY 
AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAUZATION 33 (1996) (stating that the land-
scapes of globalization give way to ideoscapes, ethnoscapes, mediascapes, financescapes, 
and technoscapes);James N. Rosenau, Preface, in LONGMAN ATLAS OF WAR AND PEACE 1 
(Joshua S. Goldstein ed., 1999) (characterizing globalization as the unfolding of the 
"[p]rocesses of de-territorialization and technological diffusion that are altering our no-
tions of space and time"). 
249 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 7. 
250 Id. 
251 Mazrui, supra note 7. 
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World. "252 One Mrican scholar, Fantu Cheru, identified five major 
trends in the world economy resulting from globalization;253 four of 
these (advancement in biotechnology and micro-technology, de-
creased diffusion of investment, structural adjustment as an ideology 
of development,254 and low regional cooperation) can be seen to work 
against Africa. Those with this critical perspective portend that Mrica 
will be barred from "gaining access to world society's productive pro-
cesses. "255 They also indicate that Mrica has become "the locus of 
world poverty, "256 that it has experienced a shift from reliance on bi-
lateral assistance to multilateral concessionary loans,257 and that it has 
lost $148 billion in capital flight. 258 Globalization is said to spell the 
absence of agreement over a vision of a common agenda for Mrica in 
the post-Cold War era.259 "[T]he greatest challenge" for Mrica, as Mit-
telman says, "is to demarginalize when national options are severely 
constrained by the forces of globalization. "260 Professor Paul Ken-
nedy's analysis, forecasting which states stand the best chance of sur-
viving materially in the twenty-first century, projects that Mricans will 
be the losers.261 These statements and predictions are not recorded 
252 David E. Duncan, Africa: The Long Good-Bye, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1990, at 20. 
The expression is meant to signifY that Africa ranks as the least-developed region in the 
developing world. 
253 Fantu Cheru, New Social Movements: Democratic Struggl1!s and Human Rights in Africa, 
in GLOBALIZATION, supra note 230, at 145, 146. The only one of these five factors that does 
not pose a problem is the increasing differentiation among developing countries, given 
that this process could favor some African countries. Id. at 147. 
254 See Mittelman, supra note 230, at 234 (conveying that the loss of control from struc-
tural adjustment "is most pronounced in parts of Africa .... "). 
255 Id. at IS. 
256 Diamond, supra note 1, at 255. The continent's share of the world's poor grew from 
sixteen percent in 19S5 to thirty percent by the turn of the century. Id. Also, as another 
scholar points out, half of the countries in the continent are under World Bank and Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programs. Wright, supra note 74, at 
17. 
257 An important distinction between default on bilateral and multilateral loans is the 
fact that a country may default on bilateral loans with manageable disruptions to the na-
tional economy. Heilbrunn, supra note 219, at 64 n.47. Most defaults precipitate negotia-
tions to reschedule payments. Id. Unlike bilateral loans, however, multilateral debts must 
be dutifully repaid according to a prearranged schedule. Id. In the event of a default, a 
country will lose all access to international credit. Given that few governments can endure 
such sanction, very few nations have ever gone into arrears on multilateral debt. Id. 
258 Wright, supra note 74, at 11 (quoting the Economic Commission for Africa). 
259Id. at 9. 
260 Mittelman, supra note 235, at IS. 
261 Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the 21st Century, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHAL-
LENGES OF A NEW CENTURY, supra note 7, at 323, 33S. Professor Kennedy's forecast consid-
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here for their accuracy, but to demonstrate the way in which many of 
the contemporary views on how Africa has fared, and will fare, with 
respect to globalization tend to be static and one-sided. 
Another view on the effects of globalization paints a more com-
plex picture. A recent illustration of this alternate view is Christopher 
Clapham's book on Africa and the international system, which asserts 
that the impact of globalization on Africa is "in many ways peculiar. ''262 
The continent was first "globalized," he notes, by European colonists 
during the late nineteenth century who imposed structures of eco-
nomic production, systems of government, and cultural changes in 
language and education.263 European colonialism has already linked 
the continent to the processes of global capitalist development.264 In 
this sense, Clapham writes, the increased economic and political ex-
ternal control beginning in the 1980s represented a "return to famil-
iar conditions of subordination."265 Interestingly, he notes, Africa was 
less affected by most of these recent changes than any region in the 
world.266 For example, he explains, the spread of global capital 
scarcely affected the continent given that, even prior to globalization, 
there were so few places where transnational corporations could find 
safe and potentially profitable investment opportunities.267 Addition-
ally, the effect of increased access to information through global 
channels was likewise negligible.268 Clapham'S depiction accords with 
this Article's caution against a wholesale and undifferentiated applica-
tion of the notion of globalization. 269 
Professor James Mittelman depicts globalization as "changing 
structured hierarchies, "270 conceptualizing the divisions of labor asso-
ciated with global restructuring as a series of interacting relation-
ered global trends in economics, the environment, politics, demographics, and techno-
logical innovations. [d. at 324, 328. 
262 CLAPHAM, supra note 233, at 24. 
263 [d. 
264 [d. 
265 [d. 
265 [d. at 25. 
267 Clapham, supra note 233, at 25. 
268 [d. 
269 See generally Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New World Order: The Trouble with the Notion of 
African Marginalization, 9 TuL.J. INT'L & COMPo L. 187 (critiquing the concept of "margi-
nalization"-a notion tied to globalization-as it is applied to analyses of Africa in the post-
Cold War era). 
270 James H. Mittelman, Preface, in GLOBALIZATION, supra note 230, at i, xi (emphasis 
added). 
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ships.271 This second, more dynamic view reflects this portrayal of 
globalization. It is also more realistic. States are not "merely passive 
objects exposed to the swell of globalization;" rather, they "may push, 
resist, attempt to circumscribe or twist" the forces of globalization to 
their own advantage.272 In 1957, Karl Polanyi described the double 
movement that propels modern society as both an expansion of mar-
ket forces and a reaction to that expansion, in the form of demands 
for self-protection against the socially disruptive and polarizing effects 
of capital. 273 Mittelman and his colleagues have updated this double 
movement by reiterating the proposition in the context of opportuni-
ties and constraints presented by changing structured hierarchies in a 
new millennium.274 Globalization involves a multiplicity of authors 
trying to write their own histories.275 These include, in addition to 
government entities, non-state actors such as multinational corpora-
tions, labor unions, religious movements, and the poor.276 These dis-
parate forces engendered in diverse and occasionally opposing con-
texts severely call into question the image of globalization as a unified 
force that will bulldoze the world around it.277 In short, as Stalker as-
serts, "[g]lobalization is not a monolithic, unstoppable juggernaut, 
but rather a complex web of interrelated processes-some of which are 
subject to greater control than others. "278 This second view does not 
portray nations as reduced to helplessness by the forces of globaliza-
tion and is thus more workable and realistic. 
C. The Effects of Globalization on U.S.-Nigerian Relations 
The force of globalization directs international attention to some 
of the "fundamental changes underway in the post-Cold War era" of 
foreign policy279 and compels dependent nations like Nigeria280 to 
271 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 6-7. 
272 Holm & S0rensen, supra note 234, at 7. As Mittelman points out, even the United 
Nations system, together with the doctrine of sovereignty that it enshrines, provides a de-
fense (albeit today a weak and ineffectual one) for developing countries against the forces 
of globalization. Mittelman, supra note 230, at 239. 
273 POLANYI, supra note 239, at 219. 
274 Mittelman, supra note 270, at xi. 
275Mittelman, supra note 230, at 232. 
276 See id. 
277 [d. 
278 STALKER, supra note 155, at 10; see also CLAPHAM, supra note 233, at 24 (stating that 
the emergence of a global culture is being challenged by a reaction favoring particularist 
ideas, and that the impact of globalization is complex and often contradictory). 
279 KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 230, at 228-29; Mittelman, supra note 235, at 2. 
280 ATE, supra note 182, at 2-3. 
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find creative responses.281 This Article examines some of these 
changes before turning to how Nigeria, the dependent country in a 
bilateral relationship with the United States, might respond. This ap-
proach accords with Professor Mittelman's depiction of the globaliza-
tion process as involving changing structured hierarchies282 and his 
conceptualization of the divisions of labor associated with global re-
structuring as a series of interacting relationships.283 
1. Characterizing the Changes and Challenges 
The latest return to democracy in Nigeria is part of the emerging 
worldwide preference for democracy that has marked the post-Cold 
War era. Although domestic forces also played a role, the reinstitution 
of Nigerian civil rule was due in large part to this globalization of de-
mocracy and human rights. With this global movement, and the weak 
economic performance of authoritarian regimes, militarized govern-
ments were isolated as illegitimate, and dictators were forced to de-
fend the basis of their power. Thus, former leader Babangida was 
eventually compelled to leave office after he annulled the fair election 
that was organized by his own government and initiated a transition 
so insincere that democratic transition program observers called it 
'" one of the most sustained exercises in political chicanery ever visited 
on a people.'''284 Similar pressures led General Abacha to resort to the 
unprecedented scheme of self-succession designed to "regularize his 
dictatorship. "285 The process of globalization brought Nigerian mili-
tary rule into sharp contrast with Abacha's practice of promoting de-
mocracy for other West African countries while withholding it from 
his own people. In a recent interview, General Obasanjo was likely 
thinking of globalization when he stated that the "parameters have 
changed." He elaborated, "[W]e are no longer in the Cold War. Dur-
281 See, e.g., Timothy M. Shaw & Julius E. Nyang'oro, Conclusion: African Foreign Policies 
and the Next Millennium: Alternative Perspectives, Practices, and Possibilities, in AFRICAN FOR-
EIGN POLICIES, supra note 74, at 237,237-48; Wright, supra note 74, at 10-16. 
282 Mittelman, supra note 270, at xi. 
283 Mittelman, supra note 235, at 6-7. 
284 Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the Descent into Praetorianism, in POLI-
TICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at 417, 443. 
285 Peter M. Lewis, Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN 
AFRICA 228, 233-34 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1999); see also Larry Diamond, 
Postscript and Postmortem, in TRANSITION WITHOUT END, supra note 49, at 465,465-84 (dis-
cussing, inter alia, the five political parties that Abacha allowed to form). 
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ing the Cold War, it became fashionable for a man to come to power 
through the barrel of a gun and for the world to accept it. "286 
Globalization has also wrought some negative changes for Nige-
ria. Among the negative consequences, felt in other African nations as 
well, are the lag in science and technology, growing impoverishment, 
capital flight, ceding of economic autonomy to multilateral institu-
tions, and the exaggeration of problems such as drug usage and 
trafficking.287 Whether the era which replaced the Cold War period 
constitutes a new international system is immaterial. The fact remains 
that, more than any other country, "America stands at the center of 
this world of globalization. "288 The United States benefits from global-
ization in its ability to conduct foreign affairs in Mrica unconstrained-
as in the past-by the political, military, ideological, and economic 
competition from the Soviet Union. This benefit is magnified by the 
fact that developing countries that maintain bilateral economic rela-
tionships with this lone superpower no longer have the leeway to play 
one superpower against another.289 
Globalization manifests itself in such a way that bilateral relations 
between the United States and Nigeria tend to favor the United 
States. But these manifestations are not entirely detrimental to Nige-
ria. As discussed, states are not "merely passive objects exposed to the 
swell of globalization" but instead may "push, resist" and "attempt to 
circumscribe or twist" the forces of globalization to their own advan-
tage.290 A mutually rewarding relationship between the United States 
and Nigeria, based on more than simple cooperation in the drug war, 
is possible if built upon the positive manifestations of globalization 
286 Wright, supra note 173. 
287 See, e.g., Shaw & E. Nyang'oro, supra note 281, at 240; Wright, supra note 74, at 9, 
11,12; Campbell & Weiss, supra note 96, at 91,98,101-02. 
288 Zakaria, supra note 7, at 30; see also RONALD W. Cox & DANIEL SKIDMORE-HESS, U.S. 
POLITICS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: CORPORATE POWER, CONSERVATIVE SHIFT 2 (1999) 
(stating that many of the political actors that have formed the process of globalization 
"originated in the overlapping worlds of business and politics in the United States"). 
289 A 1992 London Times editorial most aptly summarized the dilemma Mrica faced fol-
lowing the end of the Cold War: 
Time was when Mrican states could rely on a post<olonial superpower pa-
tronage to build their infrastructure, or at least subsidize their elites. One su-
pelpower has collapsed and the other is devoting its energies to propping it 
up. Mrica must look to the once vilified multinational companies ... for 
sponsorship, and it will be painful. 
(Cited in Peter Lyon, The Ending of the Cold War in Africa, in CONFLICT IN AFRICA 179 (Oliver 
Furley ed., 1995». 
290 See infra Part IV.B. 
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rather than the negative. Even with the Cold War over, the reality of 
Mrican international relations is still that Mricans "'have so much to 
ask for and so little to bargain with. "'291 It is a dilemma that Mrican 
leaders will have to face. 
2. Nigeria's Response 
A developing country engaged in a bilateral relationship with a 
mcyor world power needs domestic capability in order to "push, re-
sist," and "attempt to circumscribe or twist the forces of globalization 
to [its] advantage."292 Does Nigeria possess the domestic capability 
necessary for weathering globalization? The point is simple but pro-
found: in an era of globalization, as the context for Mrican foreign 
policy is shifting,293 Nigerian foreign policy cannot proceed business 
as usual. Foreign policies "are strategies governments use to guide 
their actions toward other states. "294 A sound political and economic 
base should underlie the conduct of such policy.295 Only a people 
confident and a government strong at home "can engage the rest of 
the world. "296 The evolution of economic policy from "low politics" to 
"high,"297 and the shift in foreign relations away from diplomatic pos-
turing and toward economic restructuring are two components of the 
aftermath of globalization.29B Important domestic debates regarding 
foreign policy have moved from the political arena to economic are-
nas such as finance ministries and central banks.299 
291 Vernon McKay, International Conflict Patterns, in AFRICAN DIPLOMACY: STUDIES IN 
THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 1,17 (Vernon McKay ed., 1966) (quoting former 
President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo). 
292 Holm & Sl1lrensen, supra note 234, at 7. 
293 Wright, supra note 74, at 6-lO. 
294 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 92, at 189. 
295 See Maria Nzomo, The Foreign Policy of Tanzania: From Cold War to Post-Cold War, in AF-
RICAN FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 74, at 182, 188 (commenting on the desirability of 
"strengthening [the] national economy for a stronger foreign policy," citing the party pro-
gram of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Tanzania's ruling party.); Wright, supra note 74, at 19 
(stating that "[w]ithout strengthening the economic base of African societies, foreign poli-
cies will be severely limited ... ") ; James Zaffiro, Exceptionality in External Affairs: Botswana in 
the African and Global Arenas, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES, supra note 74, at 66, 78 (noting 
that the success of foreign policy ultimately "rest[s] on [a] country's long-term economic 
strategy") . 
296 Abati, supra note 65. 
297 Wright, supra note 74, at 17. In the esoteric parlance of international relations, 
"high politics" involve issues of national security upon which the survival of the state is said 
to hinge, while "low politics" concern non-security matters such as economic development. 
298 Nzomo, supra note 295, at 182. 
m Wright, supra note 74, at 17. 
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In sum, a nation's domestic prerequisite for functional foreign 
policy is a stable and inclusive political system with space for civil soci-
ety, attention to the rule of law, and economic development anchored 
in diversification, accountability, and economic transparency.300 Mter 
over fifteen years of military rule and with recent events in the coun-
try, Nigeria does not seem to have acquired the requisite political sta-
bility that would enable effective foreign policy vis-a.-vis a major power 
like the United States. These recent developments negate or seriously 
bring into question General Obasanjo's optimism that democracy has 
come to stay. 
IV. By WAY OF CONCLUSION: FOUR FINDINGS 
First, this Article concludes that idealism, operationalized here as 
support for democracy in Nigeria, does play a role in U. S. foreign 
policy. President Clinton's visit to Nigeria just a few months after 
General Obasanjo took office,301 the lifting of the ban on flights to the 
Lagos airport, and the certification of the country as drug-free after 
many fruitless attempts under the military to get that clearance302 are 
all gestures that indicate the United States' genuine support for Nige-
rian democracy. 
Although these gestures are not unimportant, it appears that na-
tional interest, and not idealism, is still at the forefront for U.S. poli-
cymakers. In the aftermath of the tragic terrorist attacks on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the United States government moved to build a global 
coalition in its fight against terrorism. President Bush announced his 
willingness to do business with "any country or party"303 that can help 
the United States realize its objectives of combating terrorism. It ap-
pears that any country includes even illegitimate military regimes 
such as those in Pakistan. America's growing cooperation with the re-
gime of General Pervez Musharraf has given that government an air 
of legitimacy that it does not have and should not have received.304 
300 Malaquias, supra note 89, at 23, 39. 
301 This visit was the first in twenty-two years by an American president. The last such 
visit, also by a Democratic president, was made by Jimmy Carter in 1979 when, coinciden-
tally, General Obasanjo was the military Head of State. 
302 SeeJanet Mba-Molabi, Rewards o/Democratization, NEWSWATCH, Mar. 22,1999, at 28-
29 (citing the views of Maj. General Musa Bamaiyi, former head of the National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency, that the decertification was political). 
303 Colin L. Powell, A Long, Hard Campaign, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15,2001, at 53 (emphasis 
added). 
304 General Musharraf came into office on October 12, 1999, following a military coup 
he led against the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Shariff, who appointed Musharraf 
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Increased cooperation between the United States and Pakistan in the 
war against terrorism will shelve all previous attempts to pressure the 
regime to return to democratic rule so long as Islamabad's coopera-
tion is deemed necessary for successful resolution of the U.S. gov-
ernment's war on terrorism. 
President Bush announced on November 10, 2001, that his gov-
ernment was providing an aid package worth more than $1 billion to 
Pakistan as a reward for its support in the war in Afghanistan.305 Gen-
eral Musharraf, in a recent speech in New York, announced the "dawn 
of a new era of a relationship between Pakistan and the United 
States. ,,306 The major media houses evidence America's acceptance of 
Islamabad's illegitimate regime, referring to the Pakistani strongman 
as "President" rather than by his military title. Washington's open dal-
liance and fraternization with the regime of General Musharraf sug-
gest that U.S. leaders are still quick to resort to the kind of national 
interest-oriented expedience for which they have been criticized in 
the past. Moreover, there are indications that the regime in Pakistan 
may be taking advantage of the U.S. government's attentiveness to the 
war on terrorism to violate the human rights of its people.307 Pakistan 
ranked number one in human rights violations according to the State 
D ' h·h 308 epartment s most recent uman ng ts report. 
While U.S. policymakers still include idealism among the articu-
lated motivations for American foreign policy,309 pragmatic national 
army chief in 1997. Musharaff announced he took over to prevent the country from desta-
bilization, and he accused Shariff of politicizing the army. The change of government 
provoked international condemnation. A statement released by the U.S. State Department 
described the takeover as a step backward, served Pakistan notice that U.S. relations with 
the country would not be "business as usual," and disclosed that only a return to demo-
cratic rule within the shortest possible time would restore normalcy. Bamidele Adebayo, 
Coup in Pakistan, THENEWS (Lagos), Oct. 25, 1999, at 30. 
305 Elisabeth Bumiller, All Must Join Fight Against Terror, Bush Tells u.N., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 2001, at AI. It is not clear whether this aid included the $500 million already an-
nounced by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in Islamabad in October. Id. 
Id. 
306 Id. 
307 ABC Evening News (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 4, 2002). 
308 Id. 
309 See id. Secretary Powell argued: 
In this global campaign, the United States welcomes the help of any country 
or party that is genuinely prepared to work with us, but we will not relax our 
standards and we will continue to advance our fundamental interests in hu-
man rights, accountable government, free markets ... for we believe that a 
world of democracy, opportunity and stability is a world in which terrorism 
cannot thrive. 
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interest considerations obviously dominate. As a student of American 
foreign policy accurately notes, "[U.S. n]ational interests in the end 
must set limits on messianic passions. "310 Although globalization and 
the end of the Cold War have provided a changed context for the 
conduct of U.S. policy, the nation's leaders appear to have no more 
qualms about sacrificing ideology for domestic concerns than they did 
during the Cold War. 
A second finding relates to the obviously low level of U.S. eco-
nomic support for Nigerian democratization. Since military and po-
litical-diplomatic initiatives rank so highly above economic initiatives 
in U.S. policy toward Nigeria, it could be argued that the United 
States has done little more since 1999 than to normalize or "regular-
ize" its relations with Nigeria after the regimes of Generals Babangida 
and Abacha. From 1983 to 1998, Nigeria experienced the "long spell 
of crude despotism"311 associated with military rule, resulting in the 
nation's reclassification by the United Nations from a middle-income 
economy to one of the poorest countries in the world.!Il2 The people's 
agitation for democratic rule has something to do with Nigerians' 
general belief that economic progress is possible only under a civilian 
government.313 General Obasanjo has repeatedly confirmed that eco-
nomic progress will provide the "democratic dividend" that will help 
to sustain democracy in Nigeria. 
Nonetheless, the United States has refused to cancel Nigeria's 
foreign debt and has provided economic assistance that can only be 
described as modest and symbolic.314 Despite the objections of parts 
of Nigeria's Muslim majority in the North who support Osama bin 
Laden,315 Nigeria has joined the United States' global coalition in the 
SIO Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Foreign Policy and the American Character, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 8 
(1983). 
m Guest, supra note 50, at 3. 
SI2 From 1980 to 1992, the strength of the Nigerian economy declined 0.4%. The 
country's per capita income dropped dramatically from about $1,000 in 1980 to $345 in 
1998. See Guest, supra note 50, at 5. 
SIS Aka, supra note 150, at 22. 
S14 The Obasanjo government has had to lobby Congress to help it recover the esti-
mated $5.5 billion that corrupt Nigerian officials were said to have stashed away in foreign 
banks while other Western countries had no difficulty acceding to its request. This is the 
same form of help the United States rendered to the German government after World War 
II, when it assisted in the recovery of assets stolen by the Nazis. See Akande, supra note 117. 
m See 350 Died in Nigerian Riots, Christian Leader Says, Reuters, Nov. 8, 2001. Osama (or 
Usama) bin Laden is a Saudi fugitive living in Mghanistan whom the U.S. government 
alleges to have masterminded the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington, D.C. 
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war against terrorism. General Obasanjo continues to show his gov-
ernment's solidarity with the United States in its war on terrorism, yet 
Nigeria has not been rewarded economically, as has Pakistan. This 
holds true even as U.S. strikes on Mghanistan have produced "collat-
eral damage" in Nigeria, signified by bloody clashes between Nigerian 
Muslims and Christians that have resulted in the loss of hundreds of 
lives and massive property damage.316 Despite these facts, and despite 
all the talk of a paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy, 317 the growth of 
U.S.-Nigerian bilateral trade has been slow, and U.S. investment is 
primarily within the oil sector of the economy. American policymak-
ers blame this occurrence on the lack of a conducive environment,318 
but these trends have varied very little from what they were during the 
repressive era of military rule under Abacha, when U.S. relations with 
Nigeria reached their lowest point.319 This situation goes to validate 
some of the questions raised by Mrican scholars about the depth of 
the U.S. commitment to democracy; it feeds the sneering cynicism 
with which these scholars react to the very notion of U.S. support for 
Mrican democratization.320 Compared to the Clinton presidency and 
despite appearing to take "more than a passing interest" in Nigerian 
and Mrican affairs,321 the Bush administration's economic initiatives 
remain modest and symbolic. Under President George W. Bush, U.S. 
economic initiatives are advanced only through the G-8 group, a situa-
tion the Nigerian government seems to have resignedly accepted. 322 
Even here, however, countries other than the United States are driv-
ing these initiatives.323 
Thirdly, although the United States recognizes that Nigeria is an 
important "regional partner, "324 its policy toward Nigeria has been 
316 [d. (reporting that "[alt least 350 people were killed in four days of riots in north-
ern Nigeria triggered by protests against the U.S.-led strikes on Mghanistan .... "). 
317 See Minter, supra note 47, at 202. 
318 For example, Ambassador Jeter explained during his interview with some Nigerian 
reporters that "American companies will invest where they make the assessment that it will 
be profitable to do so. And I think that the conditions have to be right." Igiebor et al., 
supra note 179, at 85. 
319 [d. at 205. 
320 See Panel on Western Countries and Democratization in Mrica, supra note 80. 
321 LawaI, supra note 227, at 11. 
322 See Steve Itugbu, Nigeria and the G[-]8, THE GUARDIAN (Lagos), Aug. 5, 2001, at 39. 
Itugbu is a personal assistant to President Obasanjo. 
323 For example, the British and Canadian governments lobbied for the rescue plan 
for Africa that will be featured on the agenda for the next summit in Canada in 2002. G-8 
Rescue Plan fur Africa, supra note 225, at 18. 
324 Akande, supra note 11 7. 
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strongly, if not inextricably, tied to its policy toward Africa as a whole. 
The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act is a law for all of Africa. And 
on issues from disease to debt relief, the United States does not have a 
distinct policy toward Nigeria as it has toward Africa more generally. 
Indeed, as Clinton Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted, Nige-
ria is the "key example" of the "'stable, democratic and increasingly 
prosperous [Africa] '" that America wants to help in building,325 and 
yet U.S. investment in Nigeria itself has been minimal. The use of 
the G-8 as a channel for U.S. economic assistance may reinforce 
this one-policy orientation. 
The significance of this observation is that American foreign pol-
icy toward Nigeria has become subject to most, if not all, of the con-
straints that affect U.S.-Mrican policy. In an important critique of cur-
rent U.S. policy toward Mrica, William Minter argued that the Clinton 
presidency marked a watershed in U.S. relations with the continent. 
He said that Clinton had empathy for Mrica326 and that, more than 
any recent U.S. government, his administration injected a positive 
tone in American policy toward Africa.327 Before Clinton, U.S. en-
gagement with the continent was considered unrewarding "social 
work. "328 But under his leadership, the tone of American policy 
changed from "what to do about Africa" to "what to do with Africa. "329 
Minter found that "an extensive and continuing dialogue" is the ex-
change necessary "for the emergence of a genuine new partnership 
that is about listening, learning, and compromising. "330 More than 
any previous U.S. government, the Clinton administration took 
greater steps toward meeting this important prerequisite.331 
Yet with all the changes introduced by the Clinton presidency, 
"Mrica still receives token rather than serious responses from Wash-
52!1 Id. 
526 Minter, supra note 47, at 201. 
527 See generally Minter, supra note 47, at 200-10. In particular, see President Clinton's 
statements during his 1998 trip to Africa such as the following: "Very often we dealt with 
countries in Africa based more on how they stood in the struggle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union than how they stood in the struggle for their own people's 
aspirations." Id. at 205. Also note the statements of then-Secretary of State Warren Chris-
topher, intimating that U.S. policy toward Africa is now focused on how it might affect 
Africans themselves, rather than how it might "affect the shipping lanes next to Africa .... " 
Diamond, supra note 1, at 252. 
528 See Gordon, supra note 223, at 59. 
329 See supra notes 327, 328 and accompanying text. 
5SO Minter, supra note 47, at 210 (internal quotes omitted). 
mId. 
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ington,"332 and America is still far from implementing a policy that is 
"genuinely reciprocal and mutually beneficial. "333 Minter asserts that 
the "profound gap between promises to Mrica and realities as ex-
pressed in allocation of resources"334 may be partially attributable to a 
"racial double standard" that serves as "the invisible backdrop for 
[U.S.] policymaking on Mrica."335 Minter describes this invisible 
backdrop as follows: 
The particular place that Mrica occupies on the United 
States policy agenda, and the consequent difficulty in chang-
ing it, cannot be separated from the 500 years of history in 
which Africa's place in the world system was defined first by 
the slave trade and then by colonialism, each reality paral-
leled by deeply rooted racial stereotyping. Neither inheri-
tance has yet been overcome, while more recent cold war 
scenarios and home-grown Mrican disasters have overlaid 
their own simplistic images on the mind-sets of policymakers 
and the public.336 
This racial double standard might go a long way to explain what little 
change is occurring in U.S. policy toward Mrica,337 even in the post-
332 Id. at 200. The genocide in Rwanda is one example of this tokenism. Despite Presi-
dent Clinton's high-profile apology for his administration's failure to respond to this 
genocide, he was unreceptive to calls for an independent investigation of his administ:ra-
tion's responsibility for that failure, as Belgium, France, and the United Nations had al-
ready done. Id. at 200-01. High-level officials at the White House and the State Depart-
ment who dismissed warnings of genocide and lobbied to stop international action were 
not held accountable. Id. 
333Id. at 210; see also Peter J. Schraeder, African International Relations, in UNDERSTAND-
ING CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 129, 151 (April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 
1996) (noting three underlying principles of Cold War foreign policy that continue to 
characterize U.S. policy toward Mrica). These policies are as follows: "(1) 'Do not spend 
much money [on Mrica] unless Congress makes you'; (2) 'Do not let Mrican issues com-
plicate policy toward other, more important parts of the world; and, above all else,' (3) 'Do 
not take stands that might create political controversies in the United States.'" Schraeder, 
supra, at 151. 
334 Minter, supra note 47, at 200. 
335Id. 
336 Id. 
337 Black presence in the U.S. has little ameliorative effect on the racial orientation of 
U.S. policy toward Mrica. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, ETHNICITY, RACE AND AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 143 (1992) (arguing that U.S. policymakers rarely take "the wishes" of 
African Americans into account); WALTON & SMITH, supra note 127, at 288 (positing that 
blacks have "a continuing presence" but by no means "commanding influence" in Ameri-
can foreign policy, including its policy toward Mrica). 
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Cold War era.338 In sum, like the rest of Mrica, Nigeria is not taken 
seriously by U.S. foreign policy. 
Fourth and finally, the significance of globalization is to under-
score the necessity for new approaches in the pursuit of foreign affairs 
in a changed era. Nigerian scholars have characterized Nigeria's rela-
tionship to the United States as dependent.339 Globalization rein-
forces that dependency, with the "opportunities and constraints pre-
sented by changing structured hierarchies, "340 and instructs 
developing countries to build domestic capability in order to survive 
their relationships with major powers.341 
Since the 1970s, the United States and Nigeria have had a rela-
tionship built on mutual national interests. The U.S. government 
stood by the Nigerian people during their struggle against military 
dictatorship.342 American support for Nigeria should now be stronger 
than ever, with the re-institution of democratic government. The 
touchstone should be "genuinely reciprocal and mutually 
beneficial"343 relationships unaffected by the vagaries of power and 
party affiliation in Washington; a policy that constantly engages the 
people and the leaders of Nigeria, that is not an appendage of any 
general policy, and that recognizes the fact that only a fundamental 
358 The United States has made no attempt to intervene in the ongoing war in the 
Congo Republic (formerly Zaire) which has involved almost all of the Congo's neighbors 
and is being called by some "Africa's first World War." Commenting on this conflict, one 
U.S. specialist on Africa notes ruefully that this "first continental war, a painful test facing 
the region in the new millennium, is relegated 'pretty much to the bottom of the barrel' of 
u.s. foreign policy." Paul Salopek, Torrents of Civil War Pound Ravaged Congo Nation of Riches 
Impoverished by Legacy of Greed, CHI. nuB., Dec. 10,2000, at 1, 16 (quoting I. William Zart-
man, an analyst at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Wash-
ington, D.C.); see also Minter, supra note 47, at 200. 
339 ATE, supra note 182, at 248. 
340 Mittelman, supra note 270, at xi. 
341 Minter blames African policymakers, in part, for the lack of a coherent framework 
for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa during the Cold War era. Minter, supra note 47, at 
201. While these policymakers have been vocal and at times effective on selected issues, he 
said, they have failed to build consensus around convincing and coherent policy-related 
frameworks, have not adequately addressed the complex issues at stake, and have stressed 
criticism when they should offer alternative policy options. Id. In short, "[u]nlike the pe-
riod of clear-focused campaigns against colonialism and apartheid, no overall framework is 
being advanced collectively by African states and non-5tate movements." Id. 
342 In denying legitimacy to Nigerian military rulers, the U.S. government helped to 
frustrate their ambition for self-perpetuation in office. Another way in which the U.S. gov-
ernment proved itself an important ally of the Nigerian people was the succor and wel-
come America gave to notable individuals in the pro-democracy movement in their oppo-
sition to military rule. See Impetus for Nigeria-U. S. Relations, GUARDIAN ONLINE (Lagos), Aug. 
16,1999 (on file with author). 
343 Minter, supra note 47, at 210. 
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restructuring of the political and economic systems can bring about 
true democracy in Nigeria. 

